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INTRODUCTION

Promises in current Conservative government's Common Sense Revolution included,
more efficient, responsive government, the reform of welfare, a reduction in the size of
the government and improved service. The current provincial government in Ontario
has dramatically changed the responsibilities and financial obligations of local

government in Ontario. They began the process with the 1996 "Who Does What"
exercise in disentanglement of provincial and municipal functions. The Crombie panel
made many recommendations to the government about service delivery, cost sharing
and governance. The government chose to accept only some of these recommendations.
The final outcome of this disentanglement has been a downloading of service

management and delivery, to municipal governments, of public health, land ambulance,
social housing, childcare and most social assistance programs. The only social assistance

program the provincial government continues to deliver is the Ontario Disability
Support Program. As well as managing and delivering these programs, municipal

governments are now obligated to pay for all or part of their social services from their
local property tax base. The current government has changed the rules. They have

introduced significant legislative, regulatory and administrative changes since their
election.

In keeping their election promise, the present government has initiated dramatic

reforms to local government and specifically, to the welfare system. Initially, there was a
21 percent reduction in benefits and more stringent regulations on eligibility. Then

'

came the introduction of social assistance legislation to support the introduction of

Ontario Works, eliminate the former Family Benefits Act and create the new, Ontario
Disability Support Act. The new legislation was combined into The Social Assistance
Reform Act, 1998. This would allow the transfer of formerly provincially administered,
sole support parents to the municipally administered Ontario Works program and help

to achieve the reduction in the size of government promise. Harris could divest the
provincial administration of the Ontario Public Servants now serving sole support
parents. Ontario Works Regulations would mandate, with few exceptions, participation

in the new "work for welfare program." Increased fraud initiatives were also
introduced. Welfare reform will culminate with the completion of The Business
Transformation Project and the introduction of the new Service Delivery Model for

social assistance in 2000-2001.

The decision to download services to municipalities has created many concerns for the
government. Cost sharing of social services was a hotly contested issued between the
province and the municipalities. The province had promised that the downloading of
services would be "revenue neutral." The Crombie panel1 had recommended that the

province assume full responsibility for social assistance funding. But, it is speculated, in
the end, the province's desire to control education that made this recommendation

untenable. In order to gain control of education, the province would have to fund
education. Originally, it was proposed, the province totally fund education and the
municipalities be responsible for one half of the costs of social assistance. Because of an
outcry from municipalities and the Association of Municipalities of Ontario and the

1 Ontario, "WDW Panel Recommendations, David Crombie Chair, Who Does What Advisory Panel to
Honourable Al Leach, Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing, December 6,1996.

funding was reworked. Eventually, the province would fund one half of education; the
other half would remain on the local tax base. Ultimately, municipalities would have to
pay for 20 percent of social assistance allowances and benefits and one half of social
assistance administration costs. Notwithstanding these concerns around funding and
revenue neutrality in the transfer of services, was the important issue of who would
manage and deliver the devolved services. This paper will focus on the peculiar

organizational differences in managing and delivering the devolved services while
trying to achieve the provincial government's goal in Northern Ontario, particularly in

the District of Cochrane.

Were there organizations with the capacity to effectively deliver these complex, newly
devolved services? Would the downloading further the provincial goals of not only
more efficient and effective government, but also less government. How many fewer
public servants would be required to deliver services, particularly social assistance?
With how many local governments and agencies would the provincial administration

have to interact? These are some of the questions. Nobody really knew the answers or

how complicated the solutions would be. There were more than two hundred and fifty
municipalities, regions or special purpose bodies delivering welfare alone, more than
eighty in the North. There were hundreds of childcare service providers with whom the
province contracted. If you were to add social housing, land ambulance and public
health providers, the number of local governments or agencies with whom the province

would have to contract delivery would be staggering. The administrative workforce
that the province would have to employ would be more likely increase, rather than the

desired and promised decrease. How was the government going to meet its promise of
reduction, while providing more efficient, effective, customer-centred government?

They decided on alternative service delivery. The municipal sector would manage and
deliver many of the former provincial programs. The province would draw on several
theories to solve their problem. They would embrace consolidation, indicating the
traditional consolidationist reasoning of efficiency and equity, but their underlying
reasoning would be based on new public management theorem.

New public management is theoretically driven by successful business practices.2 New
public management theorists believe in the advantages of a larger organization's
professional management capability.3 These theorists extol that only by utilizing
technical and technological expertise, Total Quality Management, employee
empowerment, teamwork and normative management techniques can effective

functional capacity be developed in organizations.4 The province required
organizations with the capacity to be effective in the delivery of a wide variety of
downloaded services. The Harris government would employ new public management
theory in justifying its divestiture of responsibilities. New public management theorists

believe that alternative service delivery is the most efficient and effective way to deliver

public services.5 The Conservatives embraced this alternative service delivery. Based
on these theories, a decision was made that approximately 50 Consolidated Municipal

2 Osbome and Gaebler, Reinventing Government. Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley, 1992, p. 2

3 Robert Denhart, The Pursuit of Significance: Strategies for Managerial Success in Public Organizations.
Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth, 1993, p. 1.

4 Ibid., pp. 1-5.

5 F. Leslie Seidle, Rethinking the Delivery of Public Services to Citizens. The Institute for Research on

Public Policy (IRPP), 1995, Montreal), pp. 83-85.

Service Managers, about 10 in the North,6 would be appropriate for social service

management and delivery. The province believed this would enable the achievement of
the objective of downloading services while at the same time reducing their public
service.

The problems encountered by the government regarding management and delivery of
services have been different in Southern and Northern Ontario. In the South, all
territory falls under some form of local government, be that municipalities, counties or

regions. Reducing government became, according to consolidationist theory, the

reduction of multiple levels of government, into a single entity, assumed to achieve
efficiencies and economies of scale.7 The remaining regional government entities and
the newly formed single tier governments would become the Consolidated Municipal

Service Managers, enabling accomplishment of the desired, alternate service delivery of
downloaded services, while reducing the number of government structures and
administrations. In fact, in hindsight, it appears that the government felt that there
were too many local government structures in the South. They embarked on a

campaign, contrary to their right wing ideology and introduced legislation to force
amalgamations.8 Amalgamations were touted by Leach, the Minister of Municipal

6 Ontario, "Consolidation of Municipal Services Management, Consolidation Planning Framework:
Northern Ontario," Provincial-Municipal Services Realignment, Social and Community Health Services
Implementation Project, January, 1998, p. 4.

7 Andrew Sancton, Merger Mania, the assault on local government (Westmount: Price-Patterson, 2000), p.
14.

8 Ontario, Statutes, Bill 148, The City of Toronto Act, 1997; Bill 9, Taxpayers Savings Municipal
Amendment Act (Ottawa-Carleton Region), 1998; Bill 32, Greater Hamilton Area Municipal Restructuring
Act, 1998
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Affairs as being able to produce efficiencies.9 This contradicted both right wing
ideology and former statements by Harris, that bigger is not necessarily better, and that
services cost more, rather than less, in bigger communities.10 It has been suggested that

this amalgamation policy came into being when Conservative polls indicated that the
government's "ace-in-the hole" was the public's concern over the number of local

politicians.11 This strategy reflected the government's promise to reduce government.

There was a problem with this approach in the North. The North does not have
regional government upon whom the government could download management and
delivery of services. The North consists of a vast geographical area with incorporated

cities, towns, townships and unincorporated territories with no municipal governance.
^^

Amalgamation of existing local municipal government, as had taken place in Southern

Ontario, would also be impossible because of the geographical considerations. Due to

the lack of municipal governance in the unincorporated areas of the North, the
provincial offices of the Ministry of Community and Social Services delivered general
welfare assistance to these unorganized areas. This was not too problematic when the
legislation mandated only financial assistance to those in need, but became problematic
once the decision had been made to devolve many services. The Social Assistance
Reform Act and the new Ontario Works Legislation obligated delivery agents to provide
employed related services, including community placements, employment support

services and employment placement services to all clients who had mandatory

9 Ontario, Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, "A Guide to Municipal Restructuring", (Toronto,
The Ministry, 1996), Minister's Note as cited in Jerry Richmond, "The Municipal Restructuring Process in
Ontario", Backgrounder 14, February 1998, updated July 1999, p. 3.

10 John Barber, "Harris' words come back to bite him," The Globe and Mail. February 19, 1997.

obligations under the Ontario Works Act. Once the decision to devolve services had
been made, a pressing dilemma became evident. Who would deliver Ontario Works,

childcare, social housing, land ambulance and public health in the North, including
unincorporated territories? Presently, it was a mixture of municipal governments,
special purpose bodies and the provincial government who delivered these services in
the North. The option of contracting out of these services to the existing delivery agents

in the district would not achieve their envisioned integrated service delivery. They
would be dealing with hundreds of agencies instead of the desired ten. There are ten

Districts in Northern Ontario. The government would require one organization in each

District to deliver this wide array of services. In order to achieve their desire number of
consolidated municipal service managers in the North, the provincial government
would use new public management theories.

The introduction of legislation to enable the formation of Area Service Boards or District
Social Service Administration Boards in Northern Ontario contradicted Harris'
consolidationist approach to municipal governance in the rest of Ontario. He was

adopting a regionalist approach for the management and delivery of these municipal
government functions. He was creating new special purpose bodies and new larger

administrations. This was totally contrary to the movement away from regional
governance in Southern Ontario. However, this appeared the only way to solve the

peculiar problems that emerged in Northern Ontario from the changes occurring in the
Province.

11 G. P. Murray Research Limited, "At the Cutting Edge: Tidying Up?" Inside Queen's Park, Vol. 12, No.
22, December 15, 1999, reprinted with permission in AMCTO Express, December 21, 1999,p. 1.

In the North, the provincial reasoning behind this contrary approach was the
requirement to create organizations that were bigger and had more service management

and delivery capabilities. These organizations, according the new public management
theory, would be able to deliver the downloaded of services. There was a disconnect

between what the government was saying and what it was proposing to do in the
North. As early as 1996, in a Guide to Municipal Restructuring, Al Leach indicated the
province's intent to honour taxpayer's desires for a smaller, more efficient public sector

and fewer levels of government."12 He was promising efficiency; even though there is
no empirical evidence that having larger municipal governments save money.13 To the
contrary, even according to Harris, they cost more.14

In this paper, one objective is to discover the most important reasons, both short and
long-term surrounding the government's decision to create District Social Service
Administration Boards (DSSABs). The paper will be a case study of the formation of the
District of Cochrane Social Services Administration Board (CDSSAB). It will contain an
analysis of why the government felt it was necessary to override local objections to the

formation of the board. Once the reasoning has been established, a second objective will
be to examine, during the first year of existence, whether the CDSSAB has met the short-

12 Ontario, Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, "A Guide to Municipal Restructuring," 1996,
Richmond, Jerry, Research Officer, Backgrounder 14 (Revised), "The Municipal Restructuring Process in
Ontario," February 1998, updated July 1999, Ontario Legislative Library, Legislative Research Service,
available at http://www.ontla.on.ca/librarv/B14tx.htm. accessed July 19, 2000.

13 Andrew Sancton, Merger Mania, the assault on local government (Westmount: Price-Patterson, 2000), p.

^

'

67 and Andrew Sancton, "Reducing costs by consolidating municipalities: New Brunswick, Nova Scotia

and Ontario" in Canadian Public Administration. Volume 39, no. 3 (Fall) p. 268.

14 John Barber, "Harris' words come back to bite him," The Globe and Mail. February 19, 1997.
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term objectives of the province. It will also discuss whether the CDSSAB has the
organizational capacity to achieve the province's long-term objectives.

Harris, in the Common Sense Revolution had promised efficient, effective, less
government that would be more responsive and more business-like. Less government

could mean several things. To the Harris government, it meant amalgamations in the

South, in the North, it meant divesting some current responsibilities with new public
management theories on alternate methods of service delivery and reducing the size of

the troublesome, expensive public service. Harris was committed to reducing the
number of local government administrations, with which the provincial administration
must interact, furthering his goal of reducing the public service bureaucracy. Harris

also had a commitment to welfare reform. The planned welfare reform also impacted
decision-making, requiring larger scale, and technologically proficient organizations to
enable delivery.

The Alternative Service Delivery initiative of the present government embraces both

new public management and organizational management and behavior theories.15
These theories indicate that the most efficient and effective organizations are those who
are professionally managed, functionally expert, technologically advanced and have
empowered, customer-service oriented staff.

15 Ray McLellan, "Alternative Service Delivery in Ontario: The New Public Management", Ontario
Legislative Library, January 1997 accessed at http:/www.onUa.on.ca/library/fiiotel l.btm, p. 1.
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The government would, in the North, utilize new public management theories in order
to accomplish their goals, to devolve provincial government services to municipal
management and delivery and thereby reduce the size of their public service.

The author cannot purport to determine whether the consolidation has been successful

in meeting all goals, both of the province and the municipalities concerned. That is far
beyond the scope of the paper. These issues are of considerable interest to the
researcher, the province and the municipalities. The length of the paper does not allow

for a full evaluation of all-important issues surrounding formation of the CDSSAB. For
that reason, the following important questions, which the researcher found exceedingly
difficult to ignore, will not be addressed in detail in this paper:
•

Has efficiency and cost containment, as desired by both the province and the
municipalities been attained?

•

Has weighted assessment apportionment created allocative inefficiencies (are some
municipalities now paying for services they either do not receive or do not want)?

•

Has equity in both services and apportionment of costs been created for
municipalities?

•

Has the promised Local Services Realignment funding maintained the revenue
neutrality promised, for the region, for each municipality?

LITERATURE REVIEW

It is the author's contention that the main reasons behind the formation of the District of
Cochrane Social Services Administration Board (CDSSAB) were based, in the long-term,

11

i#"v

on consolidationist claims of efficiency and the achievement of economies of scale. The
short-term objectives however, were organizational effectiveness and capacity, based on
new public management theorem of organizational effectiveness and capacity for
alternate delivery of public services. This literature review will examine

consolidationist and new public management theorem to determine the province's main
objectives in the creation of District Social Service Administration Boards in the North.

In order to achieve the devolution of services, an organization was required which
would have the ability to deliver the vast array of downloaded services. During a

personal interview with Germain Lacoursiere, Regional Director, Ministry of
Community and Social Services, the initial importance, to the government, of a strong
^^

organization with capacity to deliver the five major devolved services and maintain
good customer service was stressed.16 The province needed a sophisticated

organization, with expertise in management, functional service areas and technology to
deliver integrated community and social services. Many northern communities,

including the District of Cochrane, did not have these structures in place. Achievement

of the long-term goal of efficiency was expected with the future reduction of boards and
related administrations.17 Another provincial commitment, welfare reform, produced
the Business Transformation Project. The implementation, scheduled for 2000-2001, of
the new Service Delivery Model for social assistance, necessitated a technologically
proficient, customer service focused organization.

16 Personal interview conducted July 10,2000. Interview questions attached as Appendix A.
17 Ibid.
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The debate rages on in regard to the "correct" or most efficient and effective form of
governance and the most efficient area and organization to deliver municipal services.
Differing points of view are abundant in the literature. Why would the Harris

conservatives, with their right wing ideology, propose a consolidationist solution for the
delivery of services in Southern Ontario and a regional consolidation solution in the
North? Why would he, after having publicly admitted that no cost savings were

apparent from consolidations, continue down this path? None of the empirical
literature points to savings created by consolidations.18 John Barber quotes Mike Harris,

true to his right wing ideology, "I disagree with restructuring because it believes that
bigger is better. Services always cost more in larger communities. The issue is to find
out how to distribute services fairly and equally without duplicating services."19

Less government does not necessarily mean fewer and bigger governments.

Nonetheless, the desire to reduce the number of local governments and politicians,
along with a desire to take over the education system are indicated in literature as part

of the reasoning behind the consolidations. In a Guide to Municipal Restructuring (1996),
Al Leach, the then Minister of Municipal Affairs states ".. .Taxpayers want a smaller
more efficient public sector, and fewer levels of government."20 The priority was

"downsizing public government."21 Graham Todd, a political economist, also describes

18 Andrew Sancton, Merger Mania, the assault on local government (Westmount: Price-Patterson, 2000), p.
67 and Andrew Sancton, "Reducing costs by consolidating municipalities: New Brunswick, Nova Scotia
and Ontario" in Canadian Public Administration. Volume 39, no. 3 (Fall) p. 268.

19 John Barber, "Harris' words come back to bite him," The Globe and Mail. February 19, 1997.
20 Ontario, Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, "A Guide to Municipal Restructuring", (Toronto,
The Ministry, 1996), Minister's Note as cited in Jerry Richmond, "The Municipal Restructuring Process in
Ontario", Backgrounder 14, February 1998, updated July 1999, p. 3.

21 Jerry Richmond, "The Municipal Restructuring Process in Ontario", Backgrounder 14, February 1998,
updated July 1999, p. 3.
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the changes as based on the priority of "downsizing public government"22

Downloading of services to the municipalities would also cull as members of the
troublesome, powerful Ontario Public Sector Union, while stripping them of successor
rights with the introducing of Bill 136, The Public Sector Transition Stability Act, 1997.
Reducing the number of school boards would gain control of education. Forcing

consolidations and amalgamations would eliminate some of the province's most vocal
detractors, local politicians.23 The Fewer Municipal Politicians Act was now on the
political agenda.

Many of these consolidation decisions seemed to fly in the face of right wing ideology.
Although previously acknowledged by Harris that amalgamations do not save money,

but in fact, cost more, the plans for voluntary restructuring, Bill 26, The Savings and
Restructuring Act, of January 1996 were touted by Leach as a way of reducing the cost
of local government.24

Taking over education was another important reason for decision making. Education
was a prime candidate for provincial control. The province wanted to control what it
believed was a failing, overly expensive education system. There were five executive
council members who had been personally involved in the education system in
Ontario25 and wanted dearly to control and reform the system.26

22 Graham Todd, "Megacity: Globalization and Governance in Toronto, "Studies in Political Economy,
Summer 1998, p. 1 Internet site at http://www.vouku.ca/facultv/academic/gtodd/Pepers/new toronto.html
accessed on May 19, 1999.

23 G. P. Murray Research Limited, "At the Cutting Edge: Tidying Up?" Inside Queen's Park, Vol. 12, No.
22, December 15, 1999, reprinted with permission in AMCTO Express, December 21, 1999, p. 1.

24 Ontario, Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, "A Guide to Municipal Restructuring", (Toronto,
The Ministry, 1996), Minister's Note as cited in Jerry Richmond, "The Municipal Restructuring Process in
Ontario", Backgrounder 14, February 1998, updated July 1999, p. 3.

25 John Ibbitson, Promised Land: Inside the Mike Harris Revolution. Toronto, Prentice-Hall, 1997, p. 222.
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Consolidationist literature expounding the benefits of "economies of scale" also exhorts
the possibility of the provision of professional management. The amalgamation mind
set proposes the advantages of larger organization having more ability to specialize and
more qualified staff to enable the provision of professional management.
Consolidationists hold the view that an organization must be of considerable size and
covering a territory containing a sufficient number of people in order to benefit from the

aforementioned economies of scale.27

The funding of education and social assistance also helped determine decision-making.
Crombie, in the October 1996 "Who Does What" Report recommends that the provision

-^

of income redistributive program should be fully funded by the government most able
to access the broad income tax base to redistribute income to those in need.28 This is a
universally held belief, as the local base, which is property based, cannot afford,
especially during bad economic times, to fulfill the commitment of income

redistribution. The provincial government, however, did not accept that
recommendation,29 and originally suggested that local tax base absorb one half of the
cost of social assistance, in exchange for education costs. When all advice was to
remove social assistance costs from the local tax base, it was the desire to have complete

control over education that left eventually, 20 percent of allowance and benefit costs and

26 For a more full discussion of this issue see John Ibbilson, Promised Land: Inside the Mike Harris
Revolution. Toronto, Prentice-Hall, 1997, pp. 221-232.

27 For a more detailed commentary on consolidationist position see: Andrew Sancton, Merger Mania, the
assault on local government (Westmount: Price-Patterson, 2000), p. 9 and pp. 25-40.

f^

28 Ontario, "WDW Panel Recommendations, David Crombie Chair, Who Does What Advisory Panel to
Honourable Al Leach, Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing, December 6, 1996.
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50 percent of administration costs on the local tax base. In an article entitled New
Municipal Roles, John Harrison, Chair of the Regional Municipality of HaldimandNorthfolk, speculates,
"In the background, however, the antipathy of this provincial government for the
education system as it existed up until now was becoming a driving factor in
government decision-making. The government was committed to capturing

control of education by taking its cost off the property taxpayer to justify gutting
the power of the local board of education. No arguments by Crombie or anyone

else could dissuade them."30

Today's public, in Ontario, seems more concerned about saving tax dollars than the
provision of adequate social services to the population of the province. One of the
Common Sense Revolution's continuing agenda is welfare reform. Decisions would
also be partially determined around the requirements of reforming the welfare system.
Within the federal and provincial governments there was a reform agenda on the table

in regards to social programs, which were considered out of date and needing to be
restructured. "Key priorities include a coordinated restructuring of unemployment
insurance, social assistance, training and education in order to equip Canadian for the
global economy and to promote adjustment in the economy as a whole."31 The deficit
reduction agenda "puts tremendous pressure on the two biggest categories of program
spending: transfers to persons and transfers to other levels of government."32 Driven by
this fiscal agenda, grant transfers are cut drastically and provinces are allowed greater

flexibility in determining social services and defining social assistance, with the

29 Bruce DeMara, '"It's absolutely the wrong thing to do' Crombie blasts Tories on Welfare," City Hall
Bureau, The Toronto Star. (No date available - probably December 1996), p. Al.

30 John Harrison, "New Municipal Roles", in Municipal World. August 1998, p. 16.

31 Keith G. Banting, "The social policy review: policy making in a semi-sovereign society," Canadian
Public Administration. Volume 38, no. 2 (Summer) p. 284.

32 Ibid., p. 284.
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consolidation of several grants into the Canada Health and Social Transfer.33 At the
same time, social policy reform was frustrated by political complications, not being
integrated into the fiscal policy, involving multiple, varying opinions of cabinet and
caucus, social policy groups and the federal-provincial relationship. An astute Mark

Lalonde, the then Minister of Human Resources Development "regularly warned that if
the social policy community could not agree on a strategy to restructure social policy
within contemporary constraints, the job would eventually be done by others less
sensitive to the social needs of Canadians."34 Was he foreseeing the increased

"Americanized" right wing fiscal conservatism to come? Banting quotes survey data
from the Financial Post in October 22-24 of 1994 that "pointed to a hardening of
attitudes among Canadians generally towards unemployment insurance and social

_^

assistance."35 Ontario had the problem of this increased cost of social assistance and the

Harris conservatives relished the public's acceptance, no jubilation, for his welfare
reform initiative. The conservative's workfare and welfare fraud initiatives capture the
generally held opinions that people who are on welfare will not seek employment
unless forced and that fraud is abounding in the system. This public opinion helped to

precipitate the promise to revamp social assistance in Ontario. The revamping included
reductions in basic benefits for welfare recipients, the introduction of new computer

technologies including third party on-line checking of participants' assets, income and

credit rating records. The Business Transformation Project of the Ministry of
Community and Social Services is an integral, important government initiative. It is a

M Ibid., p. 286.
34 Ibid., p. 287.
35 Ibid., p. 288.
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Common Purpose Procurement agreement with Andersen Consulting to reengineer

social assistance delivery processes and develop supportive technology.

The new Service Delivery Model being developed for social assistance, with expected
implementation to be complete by mid 2001 reengineers processes and technology to

support the government's stated objectives of more responsive, effective and efficient
client services. The new model features Interactive Voice Response for clients and one
regional intake-screening unit, for the entire North, to support two-stage telephone
intake. The model will redesign business processes and outdated, separate

computerized systems into a comprehensive web-based technology that supports third
party information checking. Some of the key messages surrounding the implementation

are that it will "increase efficiency, ...generate savings, ...eliminate the province's need
to maintain multiple data basses, prevent double dipping and enable cross program and

cross-jurisdiction overpayment recovery ...change work processes and require fewer
staff at both the provincial and municipal levels."36 The province also contends that the

new model will provide better service for clients, ensure consistent service delivery and
promote self-reliance through employment. They confirm that this new model cannot

be introduced until two major government initiatives have occurred, municipal
consolidation and the transfer of sole support and temporary care cases to
municipalities.37

36 Ontario, "Key Messages - Service Delivery Model Basics Update," July 6, 1998, p. 1, Attached to a
memorandum to all social assistance staff from Assistant Deputy Ministers Costante and Ewart, dated July
6, 1998.

37 Ontario, "Qs and As - Service Delivery Model," July 6, 1998, p. 2, Attached to a memorandum to all
social assistance staff from Assistant Deputy Ministers Costante and Ewart, dated July 6,1998.
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Reengineering is a new public management theory. It is a fundamental rethinking and
radical redesign of business processes to achieve dramatic improvements in critical
contemporary measures of performance. In the delivery of social assistance, processes

were seen to be inadequately designed and inefficient. Similar to Taylorism,

reengineering breaks down work into finite activities and measures whether there is
value added or not. The theory indicates that one takes an activity, examines it, and
determines if it is necessary, and, if it is not value added, one revises, reworks, moves or
eliminates it The Business Transformation Project's, business process review contains

measures of cost, quality and speed, improvement in efficiency and effectiveness. It also
recommends appropriate organizational design, defines performance measures and is

developing an advance technological solution to complement processes and simplify
delivery.38

Osborne and Gaebler, among others, see performance measurement, another new public
management theory, as strengthening accountability.39 This is especially true when
combined with benchmarking, using the "best in industry" practices and results as

goals for every organization to achieve, either as a comparison to a baseline number, to
engineered standards, to other organizations, to an industry standard or as a

comparison of organizational achievements over time. Benchmarking cannot be
accomplished without performance measures. It is a systematic and continuous

measurement process, designed to produce action to improve performance. The types

of performance measures include: input measures, output measures, measures of

38 Business Transformation Project, Service Delivery Model, August 1998.
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efficiency (the ratio of inputs/ outputs) and effectiveness measures, (outcomes), or
quality measures (are you satisfying customer requirements). The theory is "What gets
measured, gets done."40 In Reinventing Government, the efficacy of not only
measuring, but also publishing the performance measure results, the percentage

number of errors in granting welfare in Massachusetts in 1979, was highlighted. The
error rate was 23 percent,
"When we began measuring error rates statewide, nothing happened. Bas as
soon as we published the rates for each office, things changed. Because now the
finger was pointed at managers: everyone knew if their office had a high rate. It

only took 12 months to cut it down to 12 percent Six months later, when we

published error rates for each supervisor, it fell to 8 percent."41

The current government is beginning to base funding on performance measures and
have recently released Ontario Works Community Placement results, and provided
bonus funding for all delivery agents who have exceeded provincial expectations.42

They have formed a Community Placement Secretariat to support enhance performance
management and encourage best practices among delivery agents.

Implementation of the new Service Delivery Model and the institution of performance
related funding is only possible in cohesive, technologically advanced organizations.
The province's vision of a welfare system supporting clients towards the "shortest route

to employment" needs organizational capacity to deliver. The capacity to offer a wide
variety of services, with expertise in employment planning, is essential. The revamping

of welfare necessitated the formation of larger organizations, in the North, that had the

39 David Osbome and Ted Gaebler, Reinventing Government. Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley, 1992, p.
146

^

f

40 Ibid., p. 146

« Ibid., p. 146.

Ontario, Ministry of Community and Social Services, Ontario Works Bulletin, "Implementation of

Increased Funding for Community Placement Targets", January 20,2000, pp. 1-6.
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capacity to set and manage performance targets and to operate and maintain the

sophisticated computer operations needed to properly implement these initiatives.

The new public management proponents advocate, as the consolidationist had, for
more professional management in government, but for differing reasons. The

consolidationist had wanted to avoid patronage; new public management emphasizes
the business driven agenda.43 The Harris conservatives embraced the new public
management genre by introducing an Alternative Services Delivery initiative. "Ontario

has embarked on a New Public Management initiative referred to as Alternative Service
Delivery."44 New Public Management places "a greater emphasis on performance, an

increased focus on responsiveness to citizens and accountability for results."45
^^

Expenditure restraint and alternative service delivery, including public-private
partnerships and contracting out of public services to the private sector are high the
Harris agenda. Ontario Works legislation, however, does not permit, the delivery of
Ontario Works, by other than designated municipal service managers. Even the Harris
government could not envision the delivery of social services by for-profit companies

being accepted by the voters. While the public enthusiastically supported the workfare
and fraud initiatives, Ontarians would draw the line at a corporation making profit
obviously on the backs of the underprivileged. This was demonstrated by the public
outcry when tax dollars were being spent on the expensive private sector expertise in
the Common Purpose Procurement agreement with Anderson Consulting.

43 David Osbome and Ted Gaebler, Reinventing Government. Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley, 1992, p
146.

44 Ray McLellan, "Alternative Service Delivery in Ontario: The New Public Management", Ontario
Legislative Library, January 1997 accessed at http:/www.ontla.on.ca/library/motel l.htm, p. 1. (1-3)

45 Ibid., p. 1.
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An organization's ability to adapt to change and manage in a complex environment is a
cornerstone of new public management theory.46 In the social services' world, since the

first election of the present government in 1995, there has been one change after another.
The only thing that remains constant is change. Legislative changes, regulatory

changes, technological changes, changes in directives, and finally changes in

organizations that deliver social services have occurred. The changes are not complete.
There is still devolution of future services and the introduction of the new Service
Delivery Model for Ontario Works, new regulations, new technology and intake
screening units, call centres for initial application for social assistance.

Proponents of new public management, indicate that utilizing theories such as; Total
-^

Quality Management, organizational capacity for strategic management, empowerment,

flexibility, re-engineering, an emphasis on service orientation and normative style

management, enable the "new organization" to adapt and provide efficient, effective,
customer-friendly service, a promise of the current government.
"Many people are now proclaiming a 'revolution' in management thinking, a

revolution that is making possible new gains in quality and productivity in both
the public and private sectors. Rather than seeking uniformity and control,
managers are talking about adaptability, creativity, and shared power. Rather
than depending on traditional hierarchical forms of organization, managers are
experimenting with flatter structures and more participatory ways of organizing.
Rather than focusing on the internal workings of the organization, managers are

becoming more sensitive to their clients or 'customers' and more attentive to their
relations with those in other organizations. And the results are impressive."47

An organization must make a huge commitment to training when embracing
empowerment, teamwork and normative management styles. It must understand and

46 Robert Denhart, The Pursuit of Significance: Strategies for Managerial Success in Public Organizations.
Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth, 1993, p. 1.
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embrace the concepts and commitment required. Kernahan points to these necessities if
an effective organization is desired, "intensive development of skills for the team as a
whole and for individual members to help them in understanding and managing
change, improving interpersonal communications and enabling group problem-solving
and decision-making and team-based performance management."48

New public management literature also stresses the need for strategic planning. This
includes establishing a clear vision and mission.49 It implores leaders to identify the

changes needed in their organization to ensure success.

"Business leaders have to be

able to view patterns as if they were on a balcony"50 see the organization for what it is,
identify the good and bad, identify the adaptive challenge. This takes time and effort.
Once adaptive change has been identified, the organization must move forward with
focus and discipline, mindful and empathetic of the distress, which change causes.51

Organizations must learn new ways of doing business, develop new competencies and
learn to work collectively. The question is posed, "Whose values, belief, attitudes or
behaviors would have to change in order for progress to take place."52 When describing

an organization attempting to both transform to a customer oriented, team work

centered organization and identify the adaptive challenge, it was recognized that "more
than anything else changes in values, practices, and relationships throughout the

47 Ibid., p. 1.

48 Kenneth Kemaghan, "Empowerment and Public Administration: Revolutionary advance or passing
fancy?" Canadian Public Administration. 35 (2), Summer 1992, p. 203.

49 Hal G. Rainey, Understanding & Managing Public Organizations. Second Edition, JosseyBass Inc, San Francisco, Ca, 1997, p. 358.

so Ronald A. Heifetz and Donald L. Laurie, "The Work of Leadership," Harvard Business Review. January
-February, 1997, p. 125.

51 Ibid., pp. 126-7.
52 Ibid., p. 126.
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company"53 would be the most essential component. In literature on normative

management, the leader of the organization creates an environment where all
employees share the achievement culture and values of an organization. This approach

also places "strong emphasis on training and development"54 of employees. Bennis and
Nanus explain, "Managers have to provide vision and manage symbols in ways that
lead employees to understand the goals of the organization and to be inspired by

This preceding new public management theory is embodied in the government's
decision to move to alternative service delivery. The province needed delivery agents in

the North with these organizational qualities, if they were to achieve their objectives of
effective, customer-centred government.

With change and complexity becoming commonplace, Denhart feels that public
managers must shift their focus from "giving orders" and maintaining control to

becoming more creative, innovative, promoting dialogue and innovation" and building

effective relationships "within and with outside organizations as critical to their

success.56 Denhart believes that today's public organizations, beleaguered by budget
cuts while being expected to "do more than less" and maintain a high level of customer

5J Ibid., p. 126.

54 Edward Lawler III, "Creating the High-Involvement Organization," in Jay Galbraith, Edward Lawler III,

t
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et al, Organizing for the Future. San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1993, p. 188.

5S Bennis and Nanus, as cited in Ibid., p. 187.

M Robert Denhart, The Pursuit of Significance: Strategies for Managerial Success in Public Organizations.
Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth, 1993, p. 2.
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service, it is those organizations transformed and initiated "comprehensive efforts to
improve quality and productivity"57 who will succeed.

Denhart believes that some of the present day managerial transplantation of business

concepts into the public sector has been positive, and states that public sector managers

have "become more attentive to planning, more results-oriented, and more attuned to
cost-effectiveness."58 He however points out the downfall of trying to implement
business only driven agendas in public organizations, that the circumstances and core

values of government different than those of business. Human services should not be
delivered with solely a business agenda. The public has a right to expect that values be
a consideration in the delivery of these services.

"The point is not that efficiency is unimportant: indeed, there is no question but that

efficiency is extremely important in government. The point is that efficiency is not the
single nor even necessarily the most important criterion for evaluating the work of
public agencies."59 A study by Otto Brodtrick, Office of the Auditor General in Canada,

focused on high performance government organizations and analyzed the management
philosophy and practice that resulted in their success. The study concludes that the

following were some of the criteria of success: "an emphasis on people, participative
leadership, innovative work styles, a strong client orientation and, most important a
mindset that seeks optimum performance."60 Brodtrick is quoted as indicating that in
these organizations, people "hold values that drive them to always seek improvement in
their organization's performance. When conditions change, they adjust their methods

57 Ibid., p. 3.
58 Ibid., pp. 9-10.

25

not their values. Because of this orientation toward performance and adaptability, the
organization performs well even in a changing environment. This mindset may be the
most important attribute of all."61

The crystallization of these business-driven agendas has abounded since the 1980s. The

federal conservatives introduced, "Public Service 2000", Mulroney's desire for
"Canadian government to be 'leaner and meaner/"

British Prime Minister Thatcher's

Financial Management Initiative defined a government agency or department as an
organization. In that organization managers have, "a clear view of their objectives and

means to assess, and wherever possible, measure outputs or performance in relation to

those objectives [and] well-defined responsibility for making the best use of their
resource including a critical scrutiny of output and value for money."62

Denharf s critique of managerialism in public administration summarizes the
restrictions on wholeheartedly adopting business-like managerialism. He stresses

opinions of Waldo and Dimock suggesting that scientific management and efficiency
are not the only criteria on which to judge the performance of government
organizations. These organizations exist in highly charged political environment, in

which administrators are involved in policy decisions and discretion in the execution of
the policies.63 There is the need to embrace the values of service to the broader "public".

According to Hugh Faulkner, Secretary General of the International Chamber of

ysfjwv
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59 Ibid, p. 12.
60 Ibid., p. 5.

6I Otto Brodtrick, as cited in Ibid., p. 5.

62 Quote from Financial Management Initiative, as cited in Ibid., p. 10.
63 Ibid., p. 14.
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Commerce, contemporary public institutions are "far too process-driven... governed by
rules ... too hierarchical... far too prone to built-in control mechanisms ... (which) limit

the freedom of action... the capacity to respond and limit initiative

The capacity for

government to respond to change will in large measure depend on its ability to adapt

institutionally, to build in more flexibility and responsiveness and to introduce what I
describe as managerial adaptiveness."64

It was the neutral, bureaucratic provincial delivery system that the government wanted
to scrap. Alternate service delivery and devolution of services to the more responsive
municipal arena could accomplish their goal. The conservative's commitment to

alternate service delivery could be read as, reduce the number of provincial public
servants by downloading responsibilities for management and delivery of programs to

municipalities, who have generally lower salaries, and in the view of the public deliver
more effective, customer centered service. In the North, Harris needed organizations
with the capacity to deliver these services.

Downloading services to municipalities to achieve these goals is legitimized by current

theory on the public impressions of service satisfaction. A1992 Canadian national
survey65 ranked impression of service provided by public and private sector

organization in Canada. The results indicated that except for insurance companies, the
three levels of government were at the bottom of the ranking.66 The municipal civil

64 Ibid., p. 13.
65 Insight Canada Research, Perspectives Canada. Vol. 1, no. 4 (Fall 1992), p. 36 as cited in F. Leslie
Seidle, Rethinking the Delivery of Public Services to Citizens. The Institute for Research on Public Policy
(IRPP), Montreal, 1995, p. 12 and p. 77.

66 Ibid., p. 12.
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service ranked higher than the other levels of government.67 All levels of government in

Canada ranked lower in citizen satisfaction than other countries.68 Although

acknowledging that the reasons for this are complex, David Zussman has identified one
possible reason: "that the value structure of Canadians contains an element of antigovernment and anti-public service thinking despite our heavy reliance on government

as an instrument of societal change."69 Seidle also indicates that other reasoning for
improving service delivery is that an emphasis on service has moved organizations to
adopt performance measure that in turn can help achieve efficiencies and that
improvements in service can also reduce the cost of errors.70 Seidle, although

acknowledging that certain especially disadvantaged groups of citizens may still require
personal service; sites innovations such as "single window delivery" coupled with
information technology simplify interaction with government services and lead to
savings.71 Seidle states,
"A review of recent academic literature and reform initiatives in a number of
jurisdictions suggests three main routes to improved delivery of public services:

quality management, structural change to separate policy and operational

functions (notably the devolution of service delivery to agencies) and what I shall
refer to as performance-oriented measures."72

Paul O'Neill, a former deputy director of the U.S. Office of Management and Budget,
describes an alternate approach to new public management organizations in which,
managers needed to develop organizations that were adaptive, responsive and well

focused placing a premium on high performance while sharing power and taking risks.

67 Ibid., p. 12.
68 Ibid., p. 12.
69 David Zuzzman, "Government service to the public," p. 19 as cited in Ibid., p. 12.
iDia.,p.
70 Ibid.,
p. is
13.
71 Ibid., o.
p. 13.
13
72 Ibid., p. 13

28

/"*•*

He describes the "brightest and best" of ideas of new public managers today are a
commitment to value and dedication to public service, giving priority to serving the

public, embracing empowerment and shared leadership, accepting change as natural,
embracing the opportunities change provides, and employing a creative and humane
approach to changes.73

In Denhart's critique of some the managerialism prospective, he criticizes Herbert

Simon's proponent of efficiency, with no concerns around other criteria on which public
organizations are judged, such as, "liberty, justice equity, equality, responsiveness."74

Proponents of some of the theories of new public management include Denning's Total
Quality Management, ensuring that organizations are managed effectively, with the
^^

organizational structure in place to enable quick response to change, and provide

effective, efficient delivery of services.

In the Government of Ontario - Business Plan 2000-2001, Ministry of Community and
Social Services, the Ministry vision statement although stating that an affordable system

is a priority, stresses the emphasis on effectiveness, accountability and integrated clientfocused services
"An affordable and effective system of community and social services that
supports and invest in:

•

Families and communities, to encourage responsibility and accountability;

•

Adults, so they can live as independently as possible;

•

A services system in which children are safe and people most in need receive
support.

73 Robert Denhart, The Pursuit of Significance: Strategies for Managerial Success in Public Organizations.
Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth, 1993, p. 12.

74 Ibid., p. 12.
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We will be guided by the principles of shared responsibility, accountability and

fairness, as we deliver integrated and client-focused service."75

The plan reiterates the goal of ensuring effective and accountable services and the intent
not to tolerate welfare fraud. In a speech in late 1999, Celia Denov, Team Lead,

Provincial-Municipal Services Realignment, Social and Community Health Services
Implementation Project, Ministry of Community and Social Services indicates the

following government goals. "Providing efficient, effective service delivery to
individuals and families through sound business practices, improved policy capacity

and effective service system management." 76

In the new alternative service delivery initiative, the integration of human services has
risen to the forefront.

"Integration of human services is an extremely important subject,

from the perspective of the Provincial government."77 Defining municipal challenges, in
remarks to the Fall Training Seminar of the Ontario Municipal Social Services
Association on Monday, Nov. 30,1998, Suzanne Herbert, then Deputy Minister,

Ministry of Community and Social Services, illustrate the challenges ahead for
municipal service deliverers. These included assessing organization capacity to carry

out human services planning; managing change within the organization and building
internal systems needed to integrate human services.78

75 Ontario, Ministry of Community and Social Services, "Business Plans 2000-2001," p. 2. Internet site
http://www.gov.on.ca/MBS/english/press/plans2000/css.html accessed on June 26,2000

76 Ibid., p. 7.
77 Celia Denov, "Integrating Human Services: Challenges, Successes and New Ideas," Speech at the 1999
Annual Conference of the Northern Ontario Service Deliverers, Sudbury, Ontario, October 7,1999.

78 Herbert, Suzanne, "Check Against Delivery," Remarks to the Fall Training Seminar of the Ontario
Municipal Social Services Association, Toronto, November 20,1998, p. 9.
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Since integration of human services had become a priority, ensuring that organizations

were in place to enable them to deliver these integrated services was essential. In
addressing the need for integrated services, a report, Integration of Human Services,
Volume I, describes integration as a provincial goal. "The Province has strengthened its
own capacity to foster integration of services at the local level through structural
changes and through policy and legislation."79 After the decision to download services,

and once the 47 Consolidated Municipal Service Managers were in place, the desire for
integrated, customer service centered delivery of human services, at the local
government level, became an evident goal of the provincial government
"Service integration is a concept that is currently enjoying a major revival.

Current social policy directions (especially on the part of the Ontario
government) reflect a renewed will to implement integrated service delivery
models in human service programs and organizations."80

The objectives stated for integration were to "improve service quality and increase
efficiency."81

The magnetic benefits claimed which will be resolved by integrating

health and social services have been many, including claims of, reduction in gaps in
service, duplication of services and fragmentation. Although creating an intuitive

appeal to fiscally concerned governments, these have not been studied sufficiently to
warrant these claims.82 With the integration "push" on, it would be more important

than ever that the Consolidated Municipal Service Manager (CMSM) had the

organizational capacity to deliver the downloaded programs. A reference to "building

79 Ontario, Human Services Integration. Volume I - CMSM Survey. Queen's Printer for Ontario, 2000, p.
4.

80 Daniel P. Salhani and others, "Issues in the Measurement of Integrated Service Delivery in Human
Services, The Canadian Journal of Program Evaluation. Vol. 9 No 1,1994, p. 1

81 Ontario, Human Services Integration. Volume I - CMSM Survey. Queen's Printer for Ontario, 2000, p.
i.

82 Daniel P. Salhani and others, "Issues in the Measurement of Integrated Service Delivery in Human
Services, The Canadian Journal of Program Evaluation. Vol. 9 No 1, 1994, p. 2.
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capacity,"83 and an admission, the first discovered, that, at least in the short-term, the
addition of sole support parent caseload to the Ontario Works caseload, with intense
employment support activities required, will mean a cost increase to both the province
and the municipalities84, emerges in Key Messages for Municipalities contained with
memo from Kevin Costante, Assistant Deputy Minister, Social Assistance Employment
Opportunity.

A study carried out by the Ministry of Community and Social Services, in 1999, dealt
with human service integration in CMSMs. The survey was aimed at supporting

integration by examining best practices. The following are the key success factors for

integration; strong leadership, shared vision, communication, cross training, and a focus
on client and system outcomes.85 Additional success factors identified in the document
were; allocation of resources, accountability structures, evaluation of integration results,
and facilitative conditions.86 Other success factors, identified by CMSMs, included;
organizational culture, stakeholder relationship, political will, policies and procedures,

timeframes, and flexibility.87

The focus of welfare has changed from just handing out cheques to ensuring people
collecting social assistance do something for their money. Whether it be training or

83 Costante, Kevin, Memo to Social Service Administrators, subject Social Assistance Transformation
Update, December 18, 1997, p. 2.

84 Ibid., p. 3.

85 Ontario, Human Services Integration. Volume I — CMSM Survey. Queen's Printer for Ontario, 2000, pp.
42-44.

86 Ibid., pp. 45-46.
87

Ibid., pp. 47-50.
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community placement, the passive system "money for nothing"88 in Ontario has been
transformed to an active system requiring that "all able-bodied recipients work, learn
or train in return for their benefits,"89 with a high emphasis on electronic third party
checking to ensure that only those entitled to benefits receive them. This requires the
technological capacity. Mike Harris promises that with the reduction in cases,

envisioned by the fraud initiative, that there be a reinvestment of money saved,

advanced training for caseworkers to assist them in their new employment focus of
putting people back to work.90
Harris' assertions include,

"Government should be run more like a good business putting the needs of the
customer first" and "one stop shopping" and "{we will) work to get ...municipal
governments to join us in this program"91

The present government has indicated, "as it reduces costs ... {it} will move to reduce

internal duplication, offer one-stop access to services and improve delivery."92
The Harris government indicates its devolution reasoning is an improvement in
customer service. Glenna Carr, formerly with the Management Board, a strong

advocate of customer service is quoted "the present government attaches a much
higher priority to fiscal restraint:... Harris is also committed to a significant reduction
in the size of the public service."93. In his commentary on Carr's observation, Seidle
believes that there is implicitly a suggestion that these restructuring and spending

88 Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario, "Blueprint - Mike Harris' Plan to Keep Ontario on the Right
Track" April 1999 p. 16.

89 Ibid., p. 16.

90 Ibid,, p
p. 16.
91 Ibid., p. 20.
92 "Speech from the Throne on the opening of the First Session of the Thirty-Sixth Parliament of the

Province of Ontario," September 27, 1995, p. 11, as cited in F. Leslie Seidle, Rethinking the Delivery of
Public Services to Citizens. The Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP, 1995, Montreal), p. 109.

93 Ibid, p. 109.
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reduction initiatives may provide opportunities for improving public service delivery.94
Harris is described as sharing this view by stating expectations to deputy ministers,

shortly after his election, "to energetically pursue the potential for new models for
delivering services, including the creation of special operating agencies, privatization
and joint ventures."95

The research has lead the author to believe long term efficiency is a desired, albeit
possibly, theoretically untenable goal, of the province. Their most important goal was

to force the formation of organizations with the capacity to deliver effective, result and
accountability oriented, integrated services over vast geographical area in Northern

Ontario. This could only be accomplished by the formation of an organization that
would have new public management attributes, skills to adapt to change, technical

expertise, flexibility and customer-centred delivery. The primary reasoning behind the

decision to create DSSABs in Northern Ontario has been discovered. Developing
organizations with the capability to achieve alternate service delivery, including the
reengineered Ontario Works delivery, in a customer-centred environment was foremost.
Achieving this primary goal could also achieve the secondary goal of downsizing the
provincial public sector.

94 Ibid., p. 109
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HISTORY

The theoretical stage, around provincial decision-making has now been set. The next
section will provide:

•

a history of social assistance delivery in Ontario

•

an overview of the services to be devolved

•

an overview of the District of Cochrane and of the organizations that were
delivering Ontario Works when the province made their decision to download
services.

It will examine how the provincial decisions impacted on the formation of the CDSSAB.

This history will also reinforce that, regardless of local political opinions, the two
provincial objectives of having organizations with the capacity to deliver services and

the reduction of the provincial civil service were foremost on the provincial agenda in
the formation of the CDSSAB.

Long before the forced consolidation of the CDSSAB, the delivery of an ever
increasingly complicated social assistance system and funding of social assistance had

been a controversial issue with both the province and the municipalities. The
Provincial-Municipal Social Services Review committee, commissioned in 1987, and
consisting of representatives from MCSS, AMO and the Ontario Municipal Social
Services Association (OMSSA) concluded that the roles, responsibilities and funding

95 "Address by Premier Mike Harris to Deputy Ministers," June 27, 1995, mimeo, p. 4, as cited in Ibid., p.
109
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which were established in the 1960s required a fundamental rethinking as the diverse
services now required improved planning and co-ordination to best utilize resources

and function effectively.96 The recommendations97 included:
•

Full provincial responsibility, for policy, funding and management of children's

services, social assistance and facility-based care for the developmentally disabled
•

Provincial responsibility for policy, municipal responsibility for management and a
cost sharing of 75% provincial and 25% municipal

The recommendation for full provincial funding of social assistance was justified in the
report by the following:
"It is one of the least appropriate programs to be funded by the property tax
because costs tend to rise at times when local governments are least able to afford
an increase. Income support must be available, on an equitable basis, to anyone
who is eligible across Ontario, and should not depend on the revenue-generating

capacity of an individual municipality."98

Municipalities were recommended to complete the planning and delivery of the
services, recognizing that these functions should be carried out at a local level and
should contain links with other appropriate local services. These recommendations were
not adopted, but did set the stage for further discussions on the topic.

The New Democratic Government of the early 1990s commissioned a study to make
recommendations on the "disentanglement" of policy and funding roles and
responsibilities between the province and the municipalities, particularly in the areas of
social and health services. The Report of the Advisory Committee to the Minister of
Municipal Affairs on the Provincial-Municipal Financial Relationship, known as the

96 Ontario, Provincial - Municipal Social Services Review Committee, Report: Provincial Municipal Social
Services Review. Queen's Printer for Ontario, Toronto, Ontario, 1988.
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Hopcroft Report, 1993 recommended also that the province assume the responsibility

for policy making and funding of all mandatory items for general welfare, childcare and
public health. The planning, management and service delivery model was to be

determined by the province, reflected the NDP centralism. Municipalities were happy
with the recommended provincial assumption of costs but were disturbed by the lack of

local determination of planning, management and delivery of the system. Further
discussions were inevitable.

AMO prepared a policy paper in 1993" recommending one local authority for health
and social services. Their reasoning behind the recommendation was that one authority
would be more cost efficient, less duplicitous, facilitates service planning and is a one-

^^

window access to co-ordinated services. Unfortunately, the pragmatic concern with the
recession and debt reduction tabled these reforms.

The election of the Progressive Conservatives, in 1995 escalated the fiscal agenda. The

Common Sense Revolution promised less tax, smaller government and welfare reform.
The Crombie panel had released recommendations for northern governance in
December 1996. Their recommendations were to institute some form of modified
county structure.100 Legislation101 was introduced to allow for voluntary formation of
this upper-tier level of government, a position contrary to reducing government, but

99 Association of Municipalities of Ontario, "Municipal Option: Local Authority for Health and Social
Services." Policy Direction Series. AMO, Toronto, 1993.

100 Ontario, "WDW Panel Recommendations on Local Governance," David Crombie Chair, Who Does

What Advisory Panel to Honourable Al Leach, Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing, December 6,
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necessitated by the requirement of having strong organizations to enable the delivery of
the multitude of downloaded services to municipalities. During the fall of 1996 a joint

communique from Janet Ecker, then Minister of Community & Social Services and Chris
Hodgins, Minister of Northern Development and Mines indicated the direction that the
government wanted to go with regards to Northern Ontario. They were contemplating
larger units, formed with local agreement, to deliver a variety of the downloaded
services to Northern Ontario. The key themes were still less government and
efficiency.102 The province knew that this would not immediately produce efficiencies,

but remains convinced that at the end of the process, cost savings would be achieved.

The province was committed to the devolution of these services and in the end; the
province dictated both the area covered and the governance model for the CDSSAB.
Opportunity still exists for municipalities to co-operate in the formation of an Area

Service Board (ASB), which will allow for a broad range of services to be managed and
delivered across the District. The following would be the core and optional services103
that could be delivered by ASBs:

101 Ontario, Statutes, Bill 174, The Northern Services Improvement Act, 1997 reintroduced as Bill 12,
Northern Services Improvement Act, 1998.

102 From a personal interview conducted on July 10,2000 with Germain Lacoursiere, Regional Director,

MCSS, North Bay office
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Municipalities and unincorporated areas have until April 1,2002 to submit a proposal
for an ASB.

The Harris government was really more interested in the New Public Management

theory of management professionalism, results orientation and accountability, in order

to have organizations able to deliver the array of social services that was to be
downloaded. These services for which responsibility was to be assumed were
announced during "mega-week", January 1997, including assumption of responsibilities

for the following services, social assistance, childcare and social housing, as of January
1998, with land ambulance and public health to be assumed at a later date.

This assumption of services was part of the broader announcement of the realignment
of responsibilities between the province and the municipalities.104 Along with
responsibility for the delivery of these services, municipalities were also to be
responsible for the management of services and a portion of the costs, including one half
of the costs of social assistance.

103 Ontario, Association of Municipalities of Ontario, "Local Services realignment - a user's guide",
Queen's Printer, 1999, p.6.2

104 Provincial-Municipal Services Realignment, Social and Community Health Services, Implementation

Project, "Consolidation of Municipal Services Management - Consolidation Planning Framework: Northern
Ontario," January 1998, p. 1.
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A general hue and cry went out from both the large cities, because of their high
population of poor, and from all communities that were concerned with the negative

effects this would have in periods of economic downturn. The Association of

Municipalities of Ontario (AMO) lead the assault on the new funding arrangements and
negotiations began between the province and AMO to re-think the cost sharing
apportionment. An article by James Rusk, defines the funding problems faced by

municipalities because of the announcement, saying "It came under quick attack
because it would have required municipalities to absorb $4.2 billion more a year in
housing, welfare, health and social-service costs."105 Rusk indicates that there was
extreme secrecy in the provincial decision making on the original cost sharing. His
interpretation of how the decisions were made indicate that Conservative caucus

member had been shown the financial data on the programs and given opportunity to
"make their bids,"106 but indicates that,
"sources close to both the talks and the efforts to broker a new deal, the basic
parameter within which the plan will be rewritten are now clearly understood by
all sides. It must allow for:

•

taking education costs off property taxes, reforming school boards and asserting
strong provincial control over the province's new schools;

•

province-wide standards for municipally administered social services;

•

no new money to put on the table;

•

the need to reduce financial uncertainty for municipalities, the primary purpose
for revising the plan."107

•

In May 1997, a re-working of the downloaded funding arrangements was concluded but
this apportionment of costs was to change again, to the present funding arrangements
below.

105 Rusk, James, "Ontario to scrap offloading proposal," Globe & Mail. May 1997 (Actual date not
available), pp. Al and A10.
106

Ibid., p. A10.
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The government was committed to moving forward with their realignment strategies

and creating the needed governance and administrative structures that would be
required. The government wanted to ensure that the same standards and same services
were available throughout the Northern Districts, with Boards making district-wide
decisions and speaking with one voice.

THE DISTRICT OF COCHRANE

The District of Cochrane contains 145,618 square kilometres in Northeastern Ontario.
An attached map indicates the geographic location and the vast area of the District.109

The area's population is concentrated in one City, Timmins, and then distributed among

107Ibid.,p.A10

108 Ontario, Association of Municipalities of Ontario, "Local Services realignment - a user's guide",
Queen's Printer, 1999, pp. 4.1-4.61
109

See Appendix B.
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communities along the Highway 11 Corridor.110 The large unincorporated area contains
a relatively small population. Population is relatively stable, dropping by 675 or 0.7

percent from 1991 to 1996.111 The following chart indicates the incorporated municipal
areas and their population.112

DISTRICT OF COCHRANE POPULATION STATISTICS

Board

110
HI

See Appendix C.
Canada, Statistics Canada, 1991 & 1996 Census, Special Tabulations, Online, Internet http://www.on.hrdc-

drhc.gc.ca/english/lmi/eaid/ore/cen96/no/590pop e.html

112 Canada, Statistics Canada, 1996 Census, Special Tabulations, Online, Internet http://www.on.hrdc-

drhc.gc.ca/english/lmi/eaid/ore/cen96/no/590pop e.html
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The City of Timmins, Social Services Department, had a staff compliment of
approximately 19 (18.6 full time equivalents)113.

They delivered Ontario Works to an

average monthly caseload of 1490114, within the boundaries of the City. The Cochrane

District Welfare Board had a staff compliment of approximately 17 (16.5 full time
equivalents)115. They delivered Ontario Works to an average monthly caseload of 531116
to the remaining incorporated areas of the district. The provincial Ministry of

Community and Social Services delivered services to approximately 1500117cases. These
cases included sole support parents, who were previously recipients of Family Benefits,
and Ontario Works clients in the unincorporated area of the District.

CITY OF TIMMINS, SOCIAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT

The City's CAO and Council's main priorities in the last five years have been on debt
reduction, budget reduction and staffing reduction.118 The City was overly concerned
with staffing costs. The Ontario Works Act has a requirement for more intensive
employment focused programming. The staff required, to deliver the intensive

employment programs, was not approved, because of budget concerns. The Ontario

Works Business plan119 did not integrate supportive employment programming with
financial assistance. Only two additional staff were approved to deliver employment
services to a caseload of approximately 1500. The caseload ratio for caseworkers

113 Cochrane DSSAB Working Group, Consolidation/Integration Implementation Plan,, p. 19
114 Cochrane DSSAB Working Group, Consolidation/Integration Implementation Plan, Monthly caseload
statistics - January to July 1998, p. 12.

115 Ibid., p. 19.
116 Ibid., p. 12.
"7 Ibid., pp. 12-13.

118 From a conversation with the former Director of Social Services, City of Timmins.
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remained at 250:1. These budget-related decisions led to an inability to provide the
intensive employment supports and deliver the programs as they were designed.

The organization did have professional management skills and an understanding of
new public management concepts of results-orientation, accountability and the
management of change. Senior management staff of the Department of Social Services

co-wrote the Ontario Works Business Plan. The City had service standard policies in

place. For example, one such service standard was a requirement that an applicant, if
eligible for assistance, would receive their entitlement within four days of their original
intake. They also fully understood the financial consequences of not meeting targets set

in the service contract. The staff's negotiating ability enabled them to have the ministry
-p^

accept reasonable targets to be accomplished with limited resources and the
organization dedicated available resources to ensuring that they accomplished

fulfillment of the targets that had been set. They designed a monitoring system, by
which they could assess if targets were being met and were able to make adjustments
and ensure resources were dedicated to fulfilling the requirements for receiving
funding. They also made use of in-house expertise in employment programming and

utilized their relationship with community partners to ensure community placement
targets were met. The City, even with its limited resources, never had funding "clawedback" for failure to meet funding based targets.120

119 City of Timmins, "Ontario Works Business Plan", 1996
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THE DISTRICT OF COCHRANE WEI ?ARE BOARD

Employment focused programs, welfare fraud detection, results orientation,
accountability and change management are new public management theories to

required to be implemented in the reformed social assistance world. The District of
Cochrane Welfare Administration Board (CDWAB) did not reflect organization capacity

in these areas. The CDWAB, although maintaining a caseload ratio of 80:1, did not have
expertise in, technology, employment programs, financial accountability, setting and
monitoring performance measures or the professional management skills to manage the
change. Third party on-line checking through the Employment Insurance, Ministry of
—^

Transportation, and Equifax credit bureau databases required technological expertise
and infrastructure, not found in smaller organizations like the CDWAB. The cost for the
technology and the cost of long distance connections to these databases were seen as

being too expensive for the benefits gained. The CDWAB Ontario Works Business
Plan,121, was written by an external consultant, with little input from management

staff.122 Their inability to adapt to new methods of delivery was highlighted because
they continued to deliver social assistance, as in the "old days". For example, time
intensive home visits were maintained. The organization was not particularly

customer-focused. The time frame, from first application until receipt of benefits, could
be up to two weeks. They did not have any plans to migrate to the new way of doing
business, including phone first applications and a maximum time standard of client

/#™^

'

I20 Ministry of Community and Social Services, "Ontario Works 1996-97 Final Reconciliation and

Recovery Report, "Ontario Works 1998 Final Reconciliation - Summary".
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service. These standards are now being introduced by regulation. Hampered by an

inability to change the way they did business, and the lack of technical and managerial
expertise needed to plan and set appropriate targets, adjust goals, recognize

implications and negotiate appropriate targets with the ministry, the organization
faltered when results based funding was introduced. There was no high level
commitment in the organization to change and to the process of change management
required with staff. The inability to meet stated performance goals cost the DWAB
$118,270.00123 in 1998. This funding had already been spent on administering programs,
but due to lack of target achievement, the money was "clawed-back", by the province.

THE FORMATION OF THE CDSSAB

Many areas of the North124, Cochrane District included, would opt for the voluntary
decision to create either ASBs or DSSABs with geographical jurisdictions being

separated cities and separate District organizations. This would have created fourteen
service delivery agencies. This was not many more than the ten125 eventually created by
the province. The government would not accept these locally determined solutions.
The reason was the present organizations would not be suitable for their alternate

service delivery plans. Some organizations, particularly the smaller District Welfare
Boards did not have the new public management organizational prerequisites and

121 District of Cochrane Welfare Administration Board, "Ontario Works Business Plan", 1997.
122 From a conversation with the former Administrator, CDWAB, 1999.
123 Ministry of Community and Social Services, "Ontario Works 1998 Final Reconciliation - Summary",
North Bay Area Office, August 16,1999.

124 Based on a review of proposals from Thunder Bay, Kenora, Manitoulin, Cochrane
125 Ontario, Statute, The District Social Service Administration Act, 1998.
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capacity to deliver the downloaded services, including services presently delivered by
the Ministry. The status quo, or a tinkering therewith, was not an option.

The communities along the Highway 11 corridor developed a Cochrane North Coalition
to examine options for the delivery of social services in the District. Initially, in the
District of Cochrane, it appeared that there might be a co-operative regional solution.

An article in the Timmins Times, entitled Timmins for help, of March 19,1997, Chris
Polehoykie reports that "Northern municipalities have all but admitted that they won't
be able to deal with the massive down-loading of services the government of Ontario

made during 'Mega Week' announcements in January and are interested in talking to
Timmins with the potential goal of setting up a district-wide agency to delivery
services."126

At a meeting of the Cochrane North Municipal Coalition on March 16,

1997, Don E. Moorhouse, project manager for Who Does What implementation for
Northern Ontario, indicated that, with services being turned over to municipalities in

1998, "...if s time to start thinking about how to deliver some of them."127 Moorhouse

was quoted, "Collapse a few (other) boards and eliminate the duplication. Thaf s where
the savings will come from."128 Germain Lacoursiere, then senior advisor with the
Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing acknowledged that restructuring would be
difficult to achieve within the 1998 timeframe but was quoted as saying, "the status quo

is not an option."129 Lacoursiere indicated that although he didn't know how the
Cochrane North Coalition felt about Timmins, but that they should consider including

the larger centre as they had the required resources and could assist in the delivery of

126 Polehoykie, Chris, Timmins for help, Timmins Times, Wednesday, March 19, 1997
127 Ibid.
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services.130 Frank Albani, Administrator for the Town of Kapuskasing agreed that
Tirnmins was the "centre where you find the most services and looking at the options, it

would cost less."131 The Cochrane District Working Group was formed in the spring of
1997 and included members from the Coalition and the City CAO, as a representative
from the City of Timmins.

At a meeting held on May 3,1997, the Working Group

approved the following parameters and objectives,132 focused mainly on cost:
•

The service delivery agency would provide cost efficient and economical services to
the region with centralized administration, where possible.

•

The agency could provide additional services to member municipalities or member

municipalities could be contracted with to provide the services or the services could
be contracted out to the private sector

•

The services were also defined into primary functions, secondary functions, and low
priority functions.

There appears to have been some confusion around the requirements of legislated
functions as two mandated services, childcare and social housing were not included in

function list. Assessment, not a service to be delivered, was included.133 There also
appears to be other conflicting information in the minutes. Although centralized
administration was mentioned in the objectives, further discussion on management and
administration indicates that the "service provider would not require management or

128 Ibid.
129 Ibid.
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130 Ibid.

1JI Ibid.

l32 Cochrane District Working Group, Minutes of Meeting, May 3,1997, Kapuskasing, p. 1
133 Ibid., p. 2.

48

administration and a Service Delivery Agency would not require support staff to deliver
the services"134

The Cochrane District Services Board mandate would be; "a service and delivery
agency, whereby the Board would not only coordinate the delivery of services, but also
be the purchaser of such services."135 The Working Group also indicated "that it should
not create another level of bureaucracy.. .and recommended that once elected

representatives have reached decision regarding the.. .Board and to proceed further
with the proposal, the matter of administration and management be referred back to
administrative staff for recommendation."136 In the report by the Cochrane North

Municipal Working Group to the Cochrane North Coalition's Municipal Study Group,
although the objectives stressed that the "key components in the delivery of services are
cost-effectiveness and efficiency ...the main goal should be to amalgamate

administrative function and reduce staffing components by implementing centralized
administration ... one administration governing all agencies...such administration
service .. .should be given to member municipalities or the private sector on a contract

basis."137 Private sector provision of Ontario Works was not allowed by legislation.

The group emphasized, "another level of bureaucracy is not to be created by the
creation of the Board."138 These decisions would leave, in the author's opinion, only one
option for the central administration, that of the City of Timmins. However, after
consideration, this would not be acceptable to the District municipalities. The Group

134 Ibid., p. 2.
135 Ibid, p. 2.
136 Ibid, p. 2.

137 Cochrane North Municipal Working Group to the Cochrane North Municipal Study Group, "Report to
establish a Service Delivery Model," presented May 7, 1997, p. 5.
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appeared confused about several issues. Concerns were expressed, at a March 15,1997

of the Cochrane North Municipal Coalition, about the lack of information available from
the province, especially since there was the expectation that the delivery agent be in

place by January 1,1998. Although invited, the City of Timmins was not represented at
the meeting. It was recommended that the City, to facilitate further negotiations, host
the next meeting.139 The Town of Kapuskasing, on behalf of the Cochrane North
Municipal Coalition, initiated district-wide negotiations on upper tier governance

discussions with a letter of invitation for Timmins to host a meeting for discussion
purposes.140 Bad feelings erupted however, when City representatives did not receive

an invitation to a meeting of the Coalition, held on May 24,1997, in Kapuskasing. In a
letter to the Coalition, Mayor Power of Timmins states that during that meeting,

^p^

"without warning or explanation, the Cochrane North Municipal Coalition passed a

resolution to remove our CAO from the Committee that had been appointed to draft
terms of reference for a consultant." 141 The mayor of Timmins continues that Timmins

"certainly does not feel welcome at meetings of the Cochrane North Municipal
Coalition"142 and that Timmins' position on representation by population as
recommended in the MNDM presentation Approaches to Consolidating Service

Delivery in Northern Ontario" remained unchanged. The battle lines were drawn; the
North Coalition feared absorption by the more powerful City. The City wanted
financial and decision making control. Future cooperation was impaired.

138 Ibid., p. 6.
139 Minutes of the Cochrane North Municipal Coalition meeting, March 15,1997, held in Kapuskasing
140 Fax Memorandum from Barbara Major, Coordinator, Special Projects, Town of Kapuskasing, dated
March 17,1997.

141 Letter from Mayor Victor Power, City of Timmins to Mayor Fred Poulin, Chair Cochrane North

Municipal Coalition, dated June 12, 1997.

142 Ibid.
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In a May 30,1997 presentation, Approaches to Consolidating Service Delivery in

Northern Ontario, the reasoning behind "Who Does What" decisions remained "lower
costs and taxes"143 The Ministry of Northern Development and Mines did, however,

acknowledge that there was "currently no mechanism to deliver and recover the costs of
services on an area-wide basis in the North"144 but stated it was not about local

restructuring. The literature review indicates that indeed, it was. The province needed
this restructuring to occur in order for organizations to be in place to meet their
alternate service delivery objectives. The presentation also suggested that

representative be reflective of population size, a statement that the City was to latch on
to during negotiations.

^^

When it was apparent that an Area Service Board would not be voluntarily created, the

edict to begin local deliberations to form a CDSSAB, was issued from the Minister of
Community and Social Services. A transition board was formed, however animosity

developed quickly. Division lines were drawn almost immediately between the City of
Timmins, the City, and the rest of the District, the District. The City was viewed, by the
District, as the big player, who would try to control and impose their citified solutions

on the rest of the district. This perception was not hindered by the City's proposal that
they have the majority of members on the board. Both parties were extremely
concerned over how the costs would be apportioned and about keeping costs down.
Both Timmins and District politicians made inflammatory comments in newspapers. In
discussing representation on the board, Mayor Power of Timmins felt that since the City

143 Ministry of Northern Development and Mines, "Approaches to Consolidating Service Delivery in
Northern Ontario," Slides from Presentation, May 30,1997.
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would be the largest financial contributor to the board, they should have the most
representation. " He who pays the piper should call the tune."145 And "If it's not going

to cost those municipalities very much, they're likely to spend like drunken sailors."146
The District politicians responded with their own concerns about the City having
control over the board. "There are concerns from those representing communities like

Hearst, Cochrane, Iroquois Falls and Kapuskasing that a Timmins-dominated board
could simply close satellite offices and run all services from one office in Timmins."147

The Coalition submitted a proposal for a Northeast Services Delivery Agency on July 5,
1997. The territory to be covered excluded the City of Timmins. The Cochrane North

Coalition had agreed that they wanted to retain the Cochrane District Welfare Board to
dispense core services148. The City submitted their proposal149 for the establishment of
the Cochrane District Area Services Board in September 1997. The proposed ASB would

contract with the City to continue to deliver services to its residents and would also
contract with a Northern delivery agent to deliver services to the residents of the North

and unincorporated areas. There was the provision that either of the two groups could
contract with the other to provide or acquire services.

The ASB would have the ability

to determine service levels for all communities except for the City. The City would be a
non-voting member, determining its own levels of service. The City would be prepared
to be the contract service provided to the District municipalities and unincorporated

144 Ibid.
us

Ron Grech, "Rallying for representation," Timmins, The Daily Press. June 27, 1998, City page.

146 Darrel Greer, "Services board could spend like "drunken sailors," says Mayor Power," Timmins The
Timmins Times. July 11. 1998, p. 1.

147 Ron Grech, "Negotiations to draft social service board stymied," Timmins, The Daily Press. January 19,
1998, City page.

148 Cochrane North Municipal Coalition, North East Services Delivery Agency proposal, July 1997
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areas, on a cost recovery basis. The City wanted the clear understanding that there
would not be an increase of providing core services to the City.150 Both proposals
missed the mark. The importance to the province's downloading of one professional
managed service delivery agency with no unincorporated area left not served by the
DSSAB, or ASB."1

The City attempted to make peace with the Coalition, stating that their proposal would
not "attempt to control or take away any policy setting function or decision making
current the responsibility of other Cochrane District Municipalities"152, while proposing

that they act as the contracted service delivery agency for core services. They continued
however with their assertion that representation on an ASB must be representation by
population. The City of Timmins contained approximately 55 percent of the total
population.153

The Northern Services Improvement Act, 1998, confirms that Area Service Boards are

optional but District Social Services Area Boards would be imposed after April 1,1998, if
no local solution had been found. It also provided a mechanism for the province to

charge municipalities for the cost of services that had not, as yet, been downloaded.

149 City of Timmins, "Area Services Board Proposal," September 1997.
150 Chevrette, G.B., CAO, City of Timmins, "Report and Recommendation to Timmins Council Re:
Cochrane District Area Services Board," January 2, 1998.

151 Interview with Germain Lacoursiere, Regional Director, Ministry of Community and Social Services,

North Bay Area Office, conducted July 10,2000.

152 Letter from Council pen Mayor Victor Power, City of Timmins to Cochrane North Coalition, dated July

24, 1997

153 Based on Population Census Summary, District of Cochrane, revised September 23, 1994, received with

Local Services Realignment Package.
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Minister Ecker confirms efficiencies were expected in the long-term, in the following
statement.

"It would allow for interim funding arrangements to settle who pays for what
while we continue to work with municipalities on the details of the transfer of the
programs...Municipalities have to continue to find savings, identify efficiencies
and keep costs down. ..This bill would allow these services to be delivered and

funded by municipal governments, which are best able to identify and respond
to local needs. The end result will be better services, more efficient and
accountable government, and property tax reduction in future years."154

Although the Coalition continued meeting, and inviting Timmins, through January of
1998, there would be no agreement on an ASB for the Cochrane District. Separate
proposals were submitted and the province rejected both.

Understanding the main points of contention, governance control and cost sharing, that

were arising between separated cities and the rest of the Districts in the North, the

'

province redefined some of the parameters. They were committed to the establishment
of DSSABs, at a minimum. It was the only solution to their alternate service delivery
plans. The province remained committed to having approximately 50 municipal service
managers, about 10 in Northern Ontario to deliver the mandatory services.155

On September 2,1997, Janet Ecker and Chris Hodgson sent a joint letter to

municipalities advising the approach that would be followed in determining which

154 Ontario, Ministry of Community and Social Services, Backgrounder, "Legislation paves the way for
Who Does What reforms," August 21,1997, p. 30.

155 Provincial-Municipal Services Realignment, Social and Community Health Services, Implementation

Project, "Consolidation of Municipal Services Management - Consolidation Planning Framework: Northern
Ontario," January 1998, p. 1.
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municipalities and/or boards would be the consolidated managers.156 Ministers Ecker
and Leach confirmed, by letter on December 18,1997 that the policies would apply to
the municipal management of Ontario Works, childcare and social housing.157 In a
January 1998 document, Consolidation of Municipal Services Management Consolidation Planning Framework: Northern Ontario, January 1998158 changes were

specified. DSSABs no longer had to manage public health or land ambulance. They
could apply to the Minister of Health to do so, but if they did not, a municipality would
manage land ambulance services and the local board of health would continue to

manage public health. If an ASB could not be voluntarily formed, a voluntary proposal

for a DSSAB was required by March 31,1998, or there would be provincial imposition of
geographic boundaries and governance in a provincial creation of a DSSAB by the end
of May 1998. Representation would be specified in legislation, but the expectation was

that elected representatives from municipalities and unincorporated areas would sit on
the board. The definitive requirements for consolidation listed in a slide presentation
stated that consolidation arrangements must:
•

"have local agreement,

include unincorporated areas,
•

meet the requirement of about 10,

•

not leave gaps in the service area,

•

have clear accountability arrangements."159

156 Ontario, Provincial-Municipal Services Realignment, Social and Community Health Implementation
Project, Presentation, "Consolidation of Municipal Services Management - Northern Ontario," January 29,
1998, p. 1.

'"Ibid., p. 1.
158 Provincial-Municipal Services Realignment, Social and Community Health Services, Implementation
Project, "Consolidation of Municipal Services Management - Consolidation Planning Framework: Northern
Ontario," January 1998, pp. 1-11.

159 Ontario, Provincial-Municipal Services Realignment, Social and Community Health Implementation
Project, Presentation, "Consolidation of Municipal Services Management - Northern Ontario," January 29,
1998, p. 6.
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No mention is made, at this point, of representation being apportioned by population.
The plans for a DSSAB must contain^:

•

Identification of municipalities and unincorporated areas and the geographic are
covered

•

Whether a DSSAB or a single municipality will manage services

•

Council resolutions and demonstration of consent from unincorporated areas to
support the proposal

•

Description of how representation and accountability will be addressed

•

Description of service area, including population, client base, accessibility of
services, provision of services in French where applicable, linkages with other social
service providers

•

Listing of other social and community health services DSSAB wishes to provide

•

Description of cost apportionment

•

Outline of organization capacity required to manage programs and how it will be
developed

•

Timetable

Organizational capacity was now being specifically defined as being important. The

document also details the requirement for a technical infrastructure for the delivery of
Ontario Works, something which was not available in all present delivery sites and the

necessity to transfer the sole support and foster parent and unincorporated OW works
caseloads presently being served by MCSS offices. The Consolidation Planning

Framework for Northern Ontario indicates the necessity to have technical infrastructure

160 Provincial-Municipal Services Realignment, Social and Community Health Services, Implementation
Project, "Consolidation of Municipal Services Management - Consolidation Planning Framework: Northern
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in place. "It is the ministry's goal to have the technology foundation for the future in
place by the end of 1998."i«

Although meetings continued to be held, on March 31,1998, the City of Timmins
submitted its proposal for the CDSSAB, the Coalition had submitted its own proposal.
The default provisions of the legislation were enacted and the province established the
geographic boundaries for the CDSSAB. The geographic area was to be the entire

District of Cochrane, including Timmins. Talks continued regarding representation, but
an agreement again could not be reached. In a letter dated August 10,1998162, Ministers

of Community and Social Service and Northern Development and Mines prescribed
representation in a letter to the Coalition and the City. Representation would later be
—^

prescribed in legislation163 as follows:
•

Six representatives from the City

•

Five representative from all other municipalities

•

One representative from unincorporated areas

•

One representative to be provincially appointed

Expectations were stated that a working group be formed as soon as possible to develop

an implementation plan, service delivery model and the transfer of responsibilities. The
transfer of service responsibilities would take place December 31,1998. The working
group was formed, consisting of administrative and political representation from both

Ontario," January 1998.

161 Ibid., p. 12.

r162 Letter from Ministers Ecker and Hodgins to Cochrane North Coalition and City of Timmins, August 10,
1998.

163 Ontario, Statutes, The District Social Services Administration Board Act, 1998.
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the City and the Coalition group. The first meeting was held August 20,1998 and a

consulting firm was selected to begin work, in consultation with both the City's Social
Service Department and the CDWAB management staff, to develop an implementation
plan.164 Even though there was still a great deal of hostility among the working group,

the senior level administrative staff from both organizations worked co-operatively and
tirelessly, with the consultant, to prepare an Implementation Plan. The plan would
focus on the establishment of an organization capable of implementing the
government's alternate service delivery initiative.

On October 13,1998, simmering hostilities resulted in a joint letter from Co-chairs of the
Working group, Mayor Power of Timmins and Mayor Caron of Kapuskasing, to

^^

Ministers Ecker and Hodgson. The letter requested, in light of differences, an

immediate meeting with both Ministers to discuss two separate boards for the District of
Cochrane.165

The government was committed to their path, notwithstanding local political objections.

An October 21,1998 letter from Janet Ecker contained a definitive no to the request for a
meeting, a commendation on the tremendous progress on the implementation plan, and
an encouragement to continue the work.166 Work continued on the implementation plan
and plans for forming the new CDSSAB board and hiring employees. Thorny issues,

164 Minutes of a Meeting of the Cochrane District Social Services Administration Board Working Group,
August 20, 1998

165 Letter from Mayor V.M Power and Mayor J. C. Caron, Co-chairs, Cochrane District Social Services

Administration Board Working Group, October 13,1998.

166 Letter from Janet Ecker, Minister of Community and Social Services, October 21, 1998.

58

#"*v

including the hiring of a CAO, and the dissolution of assets and liabilities of the DWAB
were resolved and the new CDSSAB received its designation on February 1,1999.167

Why was the province so unyielding in its insistence of the formation of this new
regional special purpose body and administration, despite local political objections? It
is this author's belief that the reasoning was, both plans in essence, retained the current

organizations. The government, who currently contracted services with both, did not
feel that either had the organization capacity to meet their objectives. Each of the
former organizations had organizational issues that would hamstring them in the
provincially envisioned provision of region-wide, customer-centred delivery of services.

The City was preoccupied with cost, over program delivery. The CDWAB did not have
the managerial and functional expertise.

THE NEW DISTRICT OF COCHRANE SOCIAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
BOARD

One short-term goal clarified by literature and document review was the formation of
an organization that would embrace new public management theory to enable the
envisioned integrated, customer-responsive delivery of community and health services
in the North. The CDSSAB organization is reflective of new public management
theorem. Most of the senior management team are committed to ensuring an

167 Letter from Cynthia Lees, Area Manager, North Bay Area Office to co-Chairs of the CDSSAB Working
Group, dated January 12, 1999.

59

organization that reflects the best of these management theories, while maintaining the

public sector values of equity and respect for both clients and staff.

The new organization builds on the strengths of the old organizations, the lower
caseload and understanding of delivery over a wide geographical area of the DWAB,

the professional management, technical and financial expertise of the City. The ability
of the new, more progressive organization, to anticipate and adapt to changes, with new
public management skills, expertise in employment programming, finance, technology,
setting and monitoring performance measures and the management of change.

What

has been created is a more responsive organization, caseload ration of 120:1, enabling
caseworkers to give more intensive employment supports.

The organization has its head office in Timmins, maintains the former offices of the
DWAB as satellite offices, and has assumed the former MCSS office in Moosonee for

service delivery to that area. It is positioned to deliver the regional client-centred
services. It has developed effective wide-area network technology to facilitate
communication between offices and make the transition to the new Service Delivery
Model for Ontario Works.

Within four months of its designation, a tremendous amount of organizational work
had been accomplished. The consolidation of the two organizational databases was
complete, full staff complement was hired and trained in program delivery. A wide area
network, integrated with the province's system, was providing data and voice services

to all offices. The integration of sole support cases and unincorporated cases was
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complete, the new head office was fully functional and plans for moving or renovating
three of the satellite offices were underway.

The Implementation Plan168 draws on many new public management theories, reflecting
a professionally managed, team-oriented, responsive, accountable organization,
committed to employee development and to delivering client-focused services

efficiently and effectively.
"An integrated model of (service) delivery was chosen to eliminate unnecessary
duplication, streamline the service path and promote an achievement culture." "The
management and staff structure approved has been designed to empower staff to take
ownership of their profession development, contributing to organization goals and
assuming accountability for achieving their fair share or organizational targets. The new
organization has a flat management structure with the flexibility to adapt to the changing
service environment. Approximately 60 staff will serve some 3,500 Ontario Works cases,

deliver and manage Child Care and prepare to assimilate Social Housing services."
"Strategies to assume the management and delivery of Child Care Programs were created
to maintain purchase of service arrangements while reducing duplicitous delivery

functions...streamlining service to clients." "Overall, the level of service delivery has
been enhanced and will be available in both official languages in all offices." "A
comprehensive training plan details the required and recommended information and
training for all Board and staff members in the new organization. Critical training must
be completed prior to March 31, 1999, in order to ensure that the required knowledge and
skills reside within the new organization to assume the full range of delivery
responsibilities. Supplementary training will unfold thereafter."

The training plan contained within the Implementation Plan delineates the training

required to ensure a high performance and achievement culture within the
organization. However, several of the theoretical necessities that were addressed in the

literature review, are only listed as moderate priorities. The training activities169, which
reflect new public management theory, include:

•

strategic planning for the DSSAB Board

•

development of a foundation of trust and development of high performance teams,
for all management staff leadership training for the CAO

168 The Cochrane DSSAB Working Group, "A Consolidation/Integration Implementation Plan for the
Cochrane District Social Services Administration Board," December 18, 1998, pp. 1-2.

169 Ibid., pp. 60-63.
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•

management training including empowering management techniques, divesting

autonomy and decision making, building support and managing teams and conflict
resolution for program managers

•

training on building a foundation of trust and team building for all front-line staff

•

customer service training for support staff

The delay in undertaking this training is understandable; as the first order of business
was to form the organization and have the staff gain the technical skills needed to
deliver the programs. The technical training on understanding and delivering

programs was high priority and was completed, in order that the organization could
deliver the current services.

New public management theory, discovered in the literature review, purports that the

most successful public organizations ensure, as part of their strategic planning, that the
organization has established a clear vision and mission. Successful public sector

organizations must also ensure, according to the literature, that they are embracing
critical client-centred values.

During 1999, the CDSSAB conducted, with the assistance of the consultant who had

worked on the Implementation Plan, an organizational visioning exercise and the
preparation of a policy and procedures manual. The senior management team felt the
importance of maintaining the same consultant as they believed that during joint work
on the Implementation Plan, a good fit had occurred between management's

organizational objectives and the mind set of the consultant. Senior management staff
participated in a session to determine a clear vision. A draft vision was distributed to
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all staff for feedback, prior to its finalization. The vision statement170 reflects the desire
to be a client<entred, responsive to community organization valuing the individuality
of residents. The statement is intended to address the relationship building that is

required with all communities' residents, attempting to undo some of the bad feelings
that remained from the political turmoil surrounding the CDSSAB formation. The
Vision also includes the guiding principles171 for the organization, including;

•

"respect for applicants, participants, staff and community partners,"

•

effective communication with applicants, staff and community partners,
encouragement of individual professional development and team growth, and

•

"unity - bringing together the interest of all to achieve our common purpose."

Toward the end of 1999, the same consultant was again hired to facilitate the writing of
a Policy and Procedure Manual172 for the CDSSAB. The intent of the manual is that it
acts as a first source reference for staff, clarifying program delivery at the CDSSAB. It

describes the service path, directs staff to the appropriate Ontario Works Directives and
defines roles and responsibilities. It is designed to enable empowerment in decision

making for front line staff. The manual also acts as an accountability tool, another new

public management criteria. It contains local audit requirements for each policy to
ensure set standards are maintained. A panel of staff, including representation from all
functional areas and all offices within the CDSSAB met with the consultant for several

170 See attached Vision Statement, Appendix D.
171 Ibid.

172 ADW Consulting and Pauline Lewis & Associates Inc., "District of Cochrane Social Services
Administration Board Policy and Procedure Manual," May 1, 2000.
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weeks to reach consensus on the policies and procedures. In determining the
appropriate policies and procedures, decisions were measured,
"against the degree to which specific activities will contribute to the achievement
of the vision. Decisions, especially those where some discretion can be exercised,
will be examined and measured in the context of how they relate to the
organizational vision and guiding principles. Staff will be encouraged to make
decisions and demonstrate behaviors which are consistent with these principles."
173

DATA ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

Effectiveness is defined as outcome over objectives. Outcome measures focus on the
real reason for spending, whether the service is effective in meeting the mission or goals

set. Outcome measures demonstrate to funding agencies, the public and politicians that
the organization is accomplishing its mission and goals.

The effectiveness measures chosen, by the researcher, were determined by the
importance the provincial government places on two key performance measures. The

only measures, in 1998 and 1999, which were directly related to funding were
community participation targets and participation agreements signed by clients. In
2000, the province is adjusting its results based funding; funding will be based on
provincially pre-determined levels of service to be delivered to clients. The
organization will again have to have the capacity to adjust to reflect these new,
mandatory for funding, service levels.

173

Ibid., p. 1.2-1.3.
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The province is, consistent with new public management theory, moving towards more
outcome based funding. In 2000, funding for all employment-based services will be

directly related to level of service to clients. Delivery agents will "earn" their money by
target achievement of client service levels. As long as specified levels of service are
delivered to client, there will be flexibility in spending, both on client expenses and on
administrative functions, allowed. In late 1999 the province announced that there
would be bonuses for those agencies that exceeded the provincial targets for community

placements. This was an incentive for organizations to become more results oriented.
The objectives of the provincial government have been clearly defined; to provide
community placements and employment supports to enable the shortest route to
employment for clients. This commitment to enable social assistance recipients through

-^

employment supports and community placements is supported by results-based

funding. During 1998 and 1999, only the two aforementioned areas of provincial
funding that were determined by target achievement.

The determination of effectiveness is always more relevant when it can be compared.
The effectiveness of the CDSSAB will be compared with the effectiveness two previous

organizations, the City of Timmins and the District of Cochrane Welfare Administration
Board.

When conducting research, validity of the data is an important factor. The assessment of
the Ontario Works target achievement, both for community placement and participation
agreements constitute a nebulous exercise. Several factors complicate accurate

assessment of this data. Targets are set annually, for the yearly Service Contract with
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the Ministry of Community and Social Services. Service contracts do not reflect
monthly targets. The target achievement data is housed in the Ontario Works

Technology database. Once the two Ontario Works databases, the former City of
Timmins and the former CDWAB, were merged in May 1999, all data for January to

April from the two former organizations was merged, making it impossible to assess
target achievement by the two former organizations for the period of January to April
1999. For this reason, target achievement for the City and the CDWAB will be based on

the fiscal year preceding the amalgamation, 1998. Target achievement for the CDSSAB
will be based on the fiscal year of 1999. This will not accurately reflect the new
organization's ability to meet targets, but will provide an approximation of the potential

for effectiveness.

174 Ministry of Community and Social Services," CDWAB, Ontario Works 1998 Final Reconciliation -

Summary."
175

Ministry of Community and Social Services, "City of Timmins, Ontario Works 1998 Final

Reconciliation - Summary."
176

CDSSAB, "Ontario Works Database Statistical Report, 1999", February 2000.

66

/"■*>

One will note the percentage of caseload represented by targets is much higher in the
CDWAB than either the City or the CDSSAB. This reflects the CDWABs inability to set
reachable targets and the inability to negotiate reasonable targets with the Ministry.177

There was also no on-going monitoring of target achievement at the CDWAB.178 The
management of the City was able to negotiate more organizationally appropriate
targets. City management staff also monitored target achievement in order to assure

that funding-based targets were met. The CDWAB had not achieved their Ontario
Works performance targets in the past. The CDSSAB had only been operating as an

integrated organization for nine months of the 1999-year, but was during the period of
intensive change, was still able to meet the performance targets, bodes well for future

effectiveness.

In January 2000, the government announced increased funding179 was being made

available to Ontario Works delivery agents. Those delivery agents that exceeded
provincial minimum targets for community placement, would receive increased

funding of $1,000.00 per placement above minimum targets of 15% in 1999-2000 and
$500.00 for each placement achieved above the 2000-2001 target of 22.5% and the 20012002 target of 30%.

The money could be used to address unmet human service needs

within the delivery agent's area.

The CDSSAB achieved 197 percent of provincial

expectations of a minimum of 15% of caseload, in community placements and received

177 From a conversation with the former Administrator, CDWAB, summer 1999.

178 Ibid.
179 Ontario, Ministry of Community and Social Services, Ontario Works Bulletin, "Implementation of
Increased Funding for Community Placement Targets", January 20,2000, pp. 1-6.
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"bonus" money in the amount of $370,000.0018° for the period of April 1999 - March
2000.

Another short-term goal of the province was their commitment to decrease the size of
the public service, with their relatively high salary cost, and strong provincial union.

This analysis will consist of examination of the reduction in program and administrative

staffing in the Timmins District offices of the Ministry of Community and Social
Services, and a comparison of staffing of the former delivery organizations and the new
CDSSAB. Ministry staff earned approximately $15,000.00 more than comparable staff
in both the CDWAB and City organizations.181 The reduction of Ministry of Community
and Social Service staff in the District of Cochrane was:182

14 Family Benefit Act (FBA) program staff
4 FBA support staff
2 FBA managers

2 administrative staff positions

There was a total reduction of 22 provincial staff in Timmins District offices, which
served the District of Cochrane, and a comparative increase of 20183 program and

180 Ontario, Ministry of Community and Social Services, "Ontario Works Placements 1999-2000", June 6,
2000.

181 From a review of salary scales, City of Timmins, Cochrane District Welfare Board, Province of Ontario
182 Ron Devost, Program Manager, Ministry of Community and Social Services, North Bay, provided July
1999.

183 Based on organizational charts, City of Timmins, Social Services Department, 19 staff, 1998; CDWAB,
19 staff, 1998, CDSSAB, 1999,58 staff. There are some caveats surrounding the staffing information. The
City's Department of Social Services did not maintain dedicated staff for the provision of accounting and
personnel services. They purchased their financial and personnel administration services centrally from
other City departments. The DSSAB handles its own finance and personnel administrative functions. The

CDSSAB, early in 2000, increased it's staffing by six, all middle-level management positions183, to handle
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administrative staff in the CDSSAB, in 1999. The staff in the DSSAB, however, delivered
the more intensive Ontario Works employment program. The author cannot state
categorically that there was a total provincial reduction in the public service caused by

devolution of services. This case study does show the goal of reducing the Ontario

Public Service has been achieved in the District of Cochrane.

The province's goal in the establishment of the CDSSAB was to solve the particular

problems that emerged, in Northern Ontario, from the changes they were making in the
management and delivery of social services provincially. Their choice, to force the

consolidation of the CDSSAB was based, in the short-term on new public management
theories around organizational effectiveness and capacity, and on their desire to fulfil

^p^

their promise of a reduction in the public service, not on the frequently stated efficiency.
They do, however, retain efficiency as a long-term goal and believe it can be realized as

future services are devolved.

During this early stage in the CDSSABs history, the organization has proven that it is

effective in meeting provincial goals. They have developed an organization that can
effectively deliver Ontario Works throughout the district. The provincial decision to

create DSSABs was based on the need to have bigger, modernized, flexible institutions

to deliver devolved services. The CDSSAB Implementation Plan, Vision Statement and
Policy and Procedure Manual illustrate that the organization embraces the new public
management theories that the drove provincial decision-making. The CDSSAB reflects

day to day program management of Ontario Works, childcare, finance and the planning associated with the
assumption of land ambulance services.

69

j^

client-oriented values, respects and builds relationships with stakeholders and has a
commitment to employees to encourage building or an achievement culture.

In the short-term, the provincial objectives have been met

The last question this paper poses is, will the CDSSAB meet the long-range provincial
objectives of efficient, effective, integrated human services? Although much of the

following is speculative, since it can only be determined once all services are
downloaded, the organization possesses an important capacity, the capacity to change.

This is an important quality according to new public management theories. This is
reflective in some recent reorganization and planning for the assumption of future
services.

According to new public management theories, effective organizations do not remain

static. They must have the ability to change as circumstances dictate. They assess their
strengths and weaknesses in relation to the work that needs to be accomplished. The
CDSSAB exhibits this quality. During an end of first year review, a senior level
management assessment indicated that the organization had not been able to achieve

the empowered, self-directed teams envisioned in the Implementation Plan. The time
needed to undertake training, required to develop the organizational achievement

culture that would support empowered employees and self-directed teams, became an
issue. The CDSSAB, like many organizations, felt they were, "too busy fighting the
gators to drain the swamp."184 Total quality management theory around self-directed

184 Robert Denhart, The Pursuit of Significance: Strategies for Managerial Success in Public
Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth, 1993, p. 3.
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teams indicates that they falter if not enough time and resources are not put into their
development.185 This is an organizational problem that will need to be addressed if an
achievement culture is to be realized.

The organization has recently adjusted the extremely flat organizational structure

recommended by the consultants to include a middle management layer. The span of
control was too large for upper level management to handle without empowered teams.
Management felt it was too difficult to complete their planning and policy functions,
while handling the day-to-day employee management duties, during the time when
change was being implemented and new services were being assumed.

Middle

management is now in place to handle the day-to-day management issues. Senior
management needs to concentrate on the long-term goal of changing the organization to
an achievement oriented employee empowered culture. They need to take the time to

receive the training themselves and provide the training required for all staff in the
organization.

Training is an essential part of ensuring a productive organization and workforce
according to new public management theorists. "Organizations must help people gain
the skills and self-reliance to master the new environment.. ."186 This may be difficult
when the organization is still in a period of change and still assuming more services.

Although challenging, the literature review suggests that it is imperative to develop the
organizational capacity to meet provincial goals. Kernahan emphasizes that in order for

185 Mark Hequet, "TQM at City Hall," Training. March 1995, p. 64.
186 Kanter, Rosabeth Moss, "Restoring People to the Heart of the Organization of the Future," in Frances
Hesslebein, Marshall Goldsmith and Richard Beckhard (eds.), The Organization of the Future. San
Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1997, p. 142.
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empowerment to be effective, a significant amount of training must occur. Authority
cannot be.. ."delegated without the appropriate training to allow for the effective
exercising of new responsibilities."187 He also discusses other factors that must be
addressed in order for empowerment to work, including resistance from middle
managers, fearing loss of power or even jobs.188 The CDSSAB still needs to re-skill some

managers with coaching rather than authoritarian styles. In order to be a truly effective
organization, the senior management team needs to reflect and act on the following
statement,

"No executive can hide from the fact that his or her team reflects the best and the

worst of the company's values and norms, and therefore provides a case in point
for insight into the nature of the adaptive work ahead."

The CDSSAB must also allocate sufficient resources for training, institute recognition

and rewards, institute a performance management system and resolve labour relations
disputes arising from the new way of doing business.

As the literature stresses,

organizations cannot just pay lip service to empowerment.189 The CDSSAB needs to
include these goals in their future plans. They need a change in culture and values
"from territory, turf and fear to teamwork, trust and delegated responsibility"190

Self directed work teams are essential if "flat" organizations are to be effective. Team
members need to be empowered to make decisions and have to accept this
empowerment in order to be effective. After years of functioning in a "do as you are

187 Vantour, ed., Our Story, p. 61 as quoted in Kemaghan, Kenneth, "Empowerment and Public
Administration: Revolutionary advance or passing fancy?" Canadian Public Administration. 35 (2),
SUMMER 1992,194-214, p. 208.

188 Kenneth Kemaghan, "Empowerment and Public Administration: Revolutionary advance or passing

fancy?" Canadian Public Administration. 35 (2), Summer 1992, p. 208.
189

Ibid., pp. 194-214.

190 Ibid., p. 203.
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told" environment, support from the top, a tolerance of risk-taking, training and
facilitation are needed in order for teams to function efficiently. As with most
organizations, the CDSSAB named teams, but as yet, has not invested enough financial

and human resources to make their teams effective. With more services to be assumed
in the future and as the organization becomes more complex, empowered teams will be
vital to achieving provincial long-term goals.

The assumption of Land Ambulance is scheduled for transition to the CDSSAB on or
before January 1,2001. CDSSAB Board Resolution 99-88 commits the Board to assume
the services and ensure their provision in accordance with fundamental principles

including, "service will be accessible, integrated, seamless accountable and
responsive."191 There is also commitment to having a performance-based system
providing quality and cost effectiveness. This will be achieved by implementing a

system with predefined standards of care and response times that are monitored and
measured to ensure accountability.192 A commitment is also given to "clinical

excellence, response time reliability, economic efficiency and client satisfaction"193.

There is also a commitment to recognizing the important human resource component of
paramedics and the provision of a working environment "conducive to professional
career development and employee stability."194

191 Steve Triner, "Emergency Medical Services System Overview," Report to District of Cochrane Social
Service Administration Board, December 16,1999, p.2.

192 Ibid., p. 3.
l9JIbid.,p.3.
194 Ibid., p. 3.
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Although land ambulance management will be assumed by January 1,1001, the date for
devolution of social housing responsibilities has not yet been determined. In a

discussion paper on the amalgamation of the three housing authorities in the Cochrane
District195, Joe Torlone, CAO, CD5SAB, suggests economies of scale to be achieved by
consolidation, but acknowledges the current fiscal constraints and the difficulties small
organizations will have in providing the necessary products and services. He is
adamant that "further analysis must be undertaken to accurately determine if cost

efficiencies will occur."196 The proposal consolidates the functions of governance,
finance, human resources administration, technical services, purchasing and

information technology in order to reduce duplication and share expertise. Property
management services would still be offered in smaller localized modules to ensure
personal services would be maintained and there would be resources available at the
community level. The proposed governance would consist of a transition board
consisting of members from each of the present housing authorities, members of the
CDSSAB Social Housing Committee, the current Housing Authority Manager and the
CDSSAB CAO. After the devolution process is complete, the responsibility would shift
to the CDSSAB Board. The benefits proposed include:
•

a local solution,

•

the retention of existing staff from the housing authorities, as a component of the
CDSSAB, with attrition being utilized for downsizing expected from consolidation
of administrative functions,

•

a modular solution with client services remaining at the community level,

195 Joseph Torlone, "Amalgamation of the Cochrane District's Three Local Housing Authorities," Report to
District of Cochrane Social Service Administration Board, February 25,2000, pp. 1-13.
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•

a reduction in duplication and,

•

equity of standards across the district.
There is the intent of hiring a professional housing manager.

One objective of this paper was to discover the main objectives of the forced
consolidation of the District of Cochrane Social Services Administration Board. A
second objective was the analysis of whether the CDSSAB, in its first year of operation,

has met the short-term provincial objectives. The conclusion also addresses whether the
CDSSAB has the organizational capacity to meet the long-term provincial goals.

Was the CDSSAB established, as stated by the province because the "Status quo is

wasteful and inefficient/'197 or was the establishment motivated by the provincial
decision to download the management and delivery of many services to municipalities.

Once the decision to download services was made, the province required a mechanism
in the North for management and delivery of these services over a large geographic

area. The provincial desire to create an organization that would utilize new public
management theories to develop the ability to deliver effective, integrated human

services across the District's vast geographical area was foremost. The Common Sense
Revolution had committed the government to reduce the size of the public service. That

also motivated the provincial government to reduce direct delivery of services and the
number of agencies with which it had to deal, thereby reducing the amount of
administration done by the public service in Ontario.

/"^

™ Ibid, p. 8
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f
Efficiency, although referred to often, is discovered to be a long-term goal, not
necessarily expected in the short-term. This paper has shown that the short-term

provincial motivation was not efficiency, but the creation of organizations that had the
organizational capacity to deliver downloaded services, and the desire to downsize the
Ontario Public Service.

The formation of the CDSSAB, another special purpose body for Northern Ontario, and
regional delivery of services seemed to fly in the face of the new provincial policy of
reducing government by eliminating upper tier bodies, as evidenced by amalgamations
in Southern Ontario. Because it was not practical to amalgamate the vast, sparsely
^^^

populated areas of Northern Ontario into one city, the province needed another
mechanism to ensure they would be able to download services. In Northern Ontario,
they solved the problem using new public management theories. They would create
new regional bodies with the organizational capacity to handle the alternative service

delivery. The CDSSAB is one of these organizations. The plan to reduce government in

the North is still on the agenda even with the creation of a new special purpose body,
albeit in a different manner than in the south.

The organization has achieved the provincial short-term goals of organizational capacity

and effectiveness and the reduction of the Ontario Public Service. The CDSSAB has met
the province's challenge to be an effective, client centered, responsive, integrated service

197 Suzanne Herbert, Assistant Deputy Minister, "Remarks to the Fall Training Seminar of the Ontario
Municipal Social Services Association, Ministry of Community and Social Services, November 30,1998
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delivery organization, by utilizing new public management theories. They have the

technical and management expertise to deliver the wide range of services. They are a
responsive organization, with the ability to change and adapt. They are an effective,
accountable organization capable of meeting funding-based result targets.

Further, future research will be needed to determine if the province's long-term goal of
efficiency will be achieved.

The CDSSAB is an organization that has met the province's short-term objectives and,

although still facing many challenges, is positioned to meet the long-term objectives of
the province. The long-term provincial goals are multi-faceted. As the literature
indicates, they want efficiencies, less government and superior integrated services.
^^

Efficiency is emphasized in a August 21,1997 News Release from Janet Ecker regarding

the Who Does What reforms states the changes will "provide better services at lower
cost to the taxpayers." Outcome measurement will be critical in determining both the

effectiveness and efficiency of the organization. The CDSSAB has proven that it has the
capability to determine and monitor targets for new results-based funding model. Other

documentation describes the government's goals in a different perspective. In the
Ontario Government Business Plans -1998-1999 more focus is being placed on customer
service "Making Services Work for People"198 is described as, "The aim of this multiyear initiative to restructure social services to better meet people's needs."199 Creating

efficiency is still mentioned but priority is given to reducing overlap and frustration for
client and providing services that are easier to find and more effective.
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Efficiencies are expected at the completion of the downloading. Once devolution is
complete CDSSAB will have replaced the CDWAB, three Local Housing Authority
Boards and one Public Health Board. The province will have one administration to deal
with instead of the multiple municipalities and agencies with whom they contracted

service delivery of Ontario Works, childcare and land ambulance. The province will
also have eliminated direct service delivery to the unincorporated areas of the district.
This meets objectives of downsizing government, downsizing public service, and

provides an effective organizational structure with the capacity to deliver integrated
downloaded services. The CDSSAB Vision Statement should guide the organization in
making future decisions to enhance effectiveness and meet the provincial goals of
improved integrated service for the citizens of the District of Cochrane. If the CDSSAB
remains committed to new public management theories, maintaining a responsive, well

focused, managerial adept organization, the researcher believes they will be prepared
for the challenges ahead.

The CDSSAB, in its first year, achieved the organizational effectiveness desired by the
province in the short-term. It has the organizational capacity to continue to meet the
provincial objectives of effective, responsive, integrated human service delivery. The

province has also succeeded in reducing the size of the public service, in the Cochrane
District. Whether the provincial desire for long-term efficiencies will be realized would

198 Government of Ontario, Ministry of Community and Social Services, "Ontario Government Business
Plans," p. 11. Internet at http://www.gov.on.ca/MBS/englisWpress/plans98/css.html accessed Dec. 30,
1998.

199 Ibid., p. 2.
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be an interesting topic for further research. In any case, such efficiencies cannot be

determined until several years have passed.

APPENDIX "A'

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
INTERVIEW WITH GERMAIN LACOURSIERE, REGIONAL DIRECTOR,

NORTHEAST AREA OFFICE, MINISTRY OF COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL SERVICES
INTERVIEW CONDUCTED - JULY 10,2000

What prompted the Provincial Government's decision to consolidate the management
and delivery of social services?

What were the factors considered in the decision on the number of Consolidated
Municipal Service Managers?

Were there any special considerations around the geographic size of the delivery agents
in Northern Ontario?

How was the final decision arrived at regarding the number of DSSABs for Northern
Ontario?

What were the expectations for administrative efficiency and service delivery
effectiveness, both short and long term?

Has the first year achieved the desired results?
Are there expectations of further efficiencies as the DSSABs mature, assume more

services and fulfill their purpose of integrated delivery agents?

APPENDIX "B'

Ontario

APPENDIX "C

MAP ILLUSTRATING THE DISTRIBUTION OF COMMUNITIES
ALONG THE HIGHWAY 11 CORRIDOR

/0$\

APPENDIX "D"
/

District of Cochrane Social Services
Administration Board
Vision and Values

Our Vision is...
[To further develop a District service environment that is
?sponsive to community needs and which values the

\ndividuality of its residents.

\}Ve will achieve this by:
/J|

demonstrating respect for clients, staff and
zommunity partners. We will treat each person, as
;e would like to be treated.

Communicating effectively with clients, staff and
community partners.

Encouraging professional development and
individual and team growth.

Bringing together the interests of all to achieve
our common purpose.
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